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Abstract 
The Israel-Palestine conflict and the settlement problematic has recently received a lot 
of attention from the international community including the EU. The actorness of the EU 
on the international scene has further been widely criticised by scholars and its 
effectiveness analysed in various aspects. 
  
This particular research is an account of EU actorness in relation to the issue of Israeli 
settlements and the Middle East Peace Process. With a social constructivist outlook, the 
research has applied a contextualised version of the concepts of ‘opportunity’, 
‘presence’ and ‘capability’ onto a vast amount of data relating EU with Israel, the peace 
process and the settlement issue. This is done to gain knowledge on important events 
that either enable or constrain the actorness of the EU, and whether the European 
approach to the settlement problematic can be argued to be cohesive. 
  
The research finds that the close relation between the EU and Israel pose as a 
constraint for EU actorness towards the settlements. It further detects a gap between 
how the EU intends to act and its actual actorness, which seem to be embedded in an 
incohesive relation between policy areas, the Member States and the EU. 
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Chapter 1 
This initial chapter will introduce the problem on which the research will be focused. The 
first part constitutes an introduction that in brief will outline the context in which the 
research will take place. Consecutively, a literature review will be conducted to outline 
existing work made within the identified research field. Following the literature review 
the research question as well as sub-questions will be presented. Finally, the chapter 
entails an outline of the structure of the project. 
Introduction 
The EU´s actorness in International Relations (IR) and to what extend the EU 
constitutes an important player has been much discussed. It has especially been 
discussed within the field of foreign policy and external action in which EU actorness 
has been under vast criticism and argued not to live up to its potential (Tocci 2007, 
Meunier & Nicolaidis 2006, Seeberg 2009). Meunier & Nicolaidis (2006) argue that the 
EU does not live up to its potential in foreign policy due to intergovernmental forces 
between Member States while Tocci (2007) emphasises that there is nothing wrong with 
the formulation of foreign policy goals nor the tools to reach them, but that the problem 
lies in the implementation and formulation of bilateral agreements. Seeberg (2009) 
focuses on the EU´s self-perception and the wish to be an important foreign policy 
player and how this is not supported by its actual economic power, thus creating an 
incoherence making the EU look weak and untrustworthy. 
  
It is within this field of EU foreign policy that this analysis will have its starting point; 
more specifically with a focus on the continuation of Israeli settlements in the Israel-
Palestine conflict (IPC) and how the EU has and intends to actively act towards it. This 
IPC has a high priority in EU´s External Action Service (EEAS), and whether there is a 
possible gap between what the EU intends to do and what it actually does therefore 
occurs as an apparent opportunity to investigate (EEAS 1 of 6).  
  
According to the EU, the Arab-Israeli dispute is at the heart of many of the current 
disagreements between the Middle Eastern countries and therefore the EU’s main area 
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of attention in the Middle East (ibid.). The conflict is complex and multifaceted, and the 
EU has for the most been situated in the middle arguing both for Israel's right to exist 
and the Palestinians’ right to sovereignty (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 282-3). 
This research does not concern itself with who has the right to what land but 
acknowledge that the EU itself adhere to, and supports United Nations (UN) resolutions, 
meaning that the EU supports the pre-1967 borders from which Israel has continuously 
expanded its territory in the form of among others settlements (Ibid: 20). 
In August 2014, Israel revealed a plan for further settlement expansions, being the 
largest to date (Economists 06.09.14). The EU stated that it condemned the settlements 
underlining that it “undermines the prospect for a two-state solution and calls into 
question Israel's commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. 
We stress that the future development of relations between the EU and Israel will 
depend on the latter´s engagement towards a lasting peace based on a two-state 
solution” (EEAS 02.10.14). The spokesperson of EEAS, thereby, called on the 
government of Israel to urgently stop the expansion 
 
With the EU´s self-perception as an important player in IR the high priority of this 
particular conflict and the increased institutional improvements on the area of foreign 
policy e.g. the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and EEAS, 
together with the dual role of a High Representative/Vice President of the Commission 
(HR/VP). Coupled with the fact that the conflict itself has reached a critical point calling 
for action, seem to make the outcome of EU actorness ever more relevant (EEAS 2 of 
6). This is further supported by a large focus on the conflict internationally and EU 
Member States starting to act towards the IPC, latest seen with Sweden’s recognition of 
Palestine and the UK voting in favour of a Palestinian state (Euronews 30.10.14 and 
BBC 14.10.14). This creates a situation with expectations of the EU to act, which means 
that what the EU puts behind its words is of high relevance.  
 
Having identified the problem at hand, we now turn to identifying existing knowledge by 
conducting a literature review. 
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Literature review 
The literature review is divided in two parts; one looking at existing knowledge on EU 
actorness, and another looking at the existing knowledge on the EU involvement in the 
IPC. 
 
Actorness 
Actorness and international actorness of the EU has been widely discussed and 
researched from various different perspectives, both within traditional IR theories and 
beyond. The research mainly concentrates on what sort of power the EU is and thereby 
what kind of an actor it constitutes in IR, which is the traditional way of thinking within 
IR. 
Moving beyond the state-centric view of the EU´s role in IR where the focus has been 
on capabilities, Manners (2002) suggests the approach of „Normative Power Europe“ 
(NPE). Manners acknowledges that the EU is not a state and never will be. Soft power 
is important in this regard, especially through the expansion of governance, which other 
scholars such as Pace also work with when analysing EU´s relation to the IPC (Pace 
2014). But Manners also place a great deal of emphasis on identity and work from the 
perspective that the EU can have an impact in IR “merely by existing as different to 
what is else” (Manners 2002: 242). To underpin this argument he says that by merely 
existing as different to pre-existing political forms, the EU has pushed beyond the 
traditional way of thinking within IR, and that this predisposes the EU to act normatively 
(Manners 2002: 242). This means that the symbolism or perception of what the EU is 
has a great importance on its actorness. 
  
Scholars who have moved beyond what the EU is and instead analyses what it does 
with a focus on effectiveness, are for example Niemann & Bretherton (2013). With 
contributions from various scholars they have provided excessive empirical knowledge 
on the understanding of EU actorness and Effectiveness (Rhinard & Brattberg, 
Edwards, Van Schaik, Carbone, Niemann & Groen, Bretherton & Vogler). Focusing their 
analysis on different fields of EU external policy such as ‘security’, ‘trade’, ‘environment’ 
and ‘public health’, they also vary in the level of analysis being EU actorness and 
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effectiveness through institutions, bilateral agreements and/or the level of negotiation 
capability in international agreements.  
Niemann & Bretherton (2013) criticise previous approaches to study actorness from 
Jupille & Caporaso and from Sjöstadt in their core form, as they only focus on internal 
factors and miss out on the subtle inter-subjective processes that construct or constrain 
actorness in IR. By this critique they instead open up for a constructivist approach 
developed by Bretherton & Vogler (1999) emphasizing presence and the external 
environment as important components of the construction of actorness (Niemann & 
Bretherton 2013). This approach also includes elements from Jupille & Caporaso and 
Sjöstadt with the concept of capabilities focusing on the internal factors as well 
(Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 24). 
These approaches are then re-conceptualised or contextualized according to each 
author and the focus area for their analysis. The notion of coherence as part of EU´s 
capability is as an example applied and worked with in different manners, but all with 
the assumption that some level of coherence is expected for the EU to act intently 
(Niemann & Bretherton 2013: 27). Bretherton & Vogler worked with the notion of 
coherence and consistency when developing their framework, but in their analysis of 
this issue and in their recent work, they tend to focus only on coherence and have 
further developed this concept into three dimensions being vertical, horizontal and 
institutional coherence (Vogler & Bretherton 2013: 382-385). 
  
By moving away from viewing the EU as a state-like actor in IR and thereby assuming 
its effectiveness as an actor, the paradigm shift towards analysing effectiveness as a 
separate concept and then linking it to actorness, as it constitutes a great part of this, 
allows one to see what the EU actually does. Necessary for a thorough constructivist 
approach, analysing what the EU does, also enhance the more classical approaches 
within IR. 
The EU and the IPC 
The academic focus in relation to the Israeli settlements and the EU’s response thereto 
is partly centred on international law and the trade relations between the EU and Israel 
in relation to origins of goods (Hirsch 2002, Paasivirta 1999). Also, it is about the 
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inconsistency between the trade agreements and the political aspect - economic and 
political factors are separated, however, also argued to be very closely tied depending 
on the objective of the EU (Del Sarto 2011, Munin 2010, Harpaz 2008). Other bilateral 
relations between the EU and Israel i.e. the Association Agreement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are also widely debated (Del Sarto 2011, Munin 2011, 
Paasivirta 1999, Altunisik 2008). 
Hirsch’s main focus is on territorial disputes and concentrated on goods with its origin 
from territorially disputed areas and that these are often linked directly with political 
disputes (Hirsch 2002: 573). This link between economic and political factors Munin 
relates as the EU’s external relations policy that is to a large extent based on the 
principle of “trading economic benefits for political influence” and that the EU is very 
interested in gaining more influence in the Middle East (Munin 2010: 85-6, Del Sarto 
2011: 117). In relation to this, Altunisik further combines the strife for political influence 
with the EU’s interest in ensuring stability in its neighbourhood (Altunisik 2008: 105). Del 
Sarto looks into the contradiction between the tense political ties and what seems to be 
increased deepening of the economic relations between the EU and Israel. Del Sarto 
underlines that the EU has been very reluctant taking action in its bilateral relations with 
Israel to further the peace process in the Middle East (Del Sarto 2011: 130). She 
acknowledges that there is no sign that the bilateral relations will be further upgraded, 
however, a decrease in the relations do not seem to be on the table either. Altunisik 
mentions the use of political conditionality in relation to the conflict closely linked to the 
settlements. He argues that even though the Association Agreement with Israel includes 
conditionalities, suspension of the agreement has not been used as a tool even though 
Israel has continued to build settlements (Altunisik 2008: 114). Pace takes a 
governance approach to the EU’s role in the conflict and argues that the academic 
discussion has centred on EU actorness concluding that the EU has been weak and/or 
ineffective in this context. Pace argues that the EU is more triggered by using dialogue 
than making economic sanctions (2014). They simply do not see this as an option. 
Strong economic development will create a more viable environment for dialogue, and 
is therefore the main focus for the EU (ibid.).   
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Hirsch looks at the link between rules of origin and territorial disputes and at alternative 
approaches to policy makers in such cases (Hirsch 2002: 573). Hirsch argues that the 
EU’s trade policy is of great importance to Israel and therefore the determination of 
origin of goods from the settlements is of great importance to both Israel and Palestine, 
and directly linked to the political dispute (ibid.: 574). Del Sarto blames internal 
disagreements in the EU on the issue, and argues that no agreement has been made, 
however, this is when looking at the peace process as a whole, and not at the 
settlements. Harpaz looks at the issue from the Israeli side and argues that the EU has 
used “economic threats” imposing a solution to Israel on a politically sensitive issue, 
which Harpaz describes as a non-economic national policy (Harpaz 2008: 404-5). Hollis 
presents two approaches to look at territorial disputes; one with a focus on as little 
political involvement as possible mainly based in international trade law and the other 
with a greater political involvement (Hollis 2004: 198-201). Hollis argues that the EU can 
make a difference in the conflict by among others offering Israel a special relationship 
with the EU on the condition that Israel gives up its claim to the West Bank and Gaza 
(ibid.: 191). 
Limitation & position 
Our contribution is to extend the existing research zooming in on EU actorness in 
relation to the settlements and the relation between economic and political interests. We 
will look into the cohesiveness between the EU’s official statements on the settlements 
and how this corresponds with the bilateral relations between the EU and Israel. Special 
attention will be on the perceptions and expectations that the EU and Israel have of one 
another looking into the relationship between the two. 
We further examine the EU action/inaction in relation to the settlements, and what 
explanations there might be. We strive to move beyond the discussion of the EU’s 
internal capabilities looking almost solely on the external factors. 
We wish to fit the pieces together on EU actorness in relation to the settlement 
problematic taking all the above factors into consideration and look into their 
interconnectedness. To help us do this we have formulated research questions to guide 
the research; 
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Research Questions 
The above leads us to the following main research question; 
  
To what extend can EU actorness towards the Israeli settlements be described as 
cohesive, and what seem to enable or constrain this process? 
  
In order to break down the above main research question we address the following 
three sub-questions: 
1. Which actions have already been taken by the EU and how does it relate to the 
EU’s official stand on the settlements 
2. How are contemporary factors and events affecting the process and how have 
they impacted on EU actorness in relation to the settlements? 
3. What seems to constitute as the most important factors that either enable or 
constrain the process? 
Defining key elements 
This part will serve to explain how the above research questions will help us unfold and 
answer the main research question. The order of the research questions represents the 
overall structure of the project, which will be further elaborated in Chapter 2. However, 
in order to ensure an understanding of the research questions at this point the key 
elements within them will be defined. 
  
Answering the main research question will entail unfolding the EU actorness in relation 
to the Israeli settlements. The actorness of the EU relates to the behaviour of the EU 
both internally and externally. The concept is widely discussed and will also be looked 
at from various angles in Chapter 2 of this project, and will therefore not be defined 
here. The settlements referred to are Israeli settlements on territory occupied after 
1967, which according to international law is not rightfully theirs. By cohesiveness we 
refer to the relation between the EU’s actions, and whether they correspond to each 
other i.e. what the EU says, stands for and does. Furthermore, it relates to the EU’s 
ability to act in a way in which it does not contradict or compromise itself forming a 
 11 
united whole (Hornby 2000: 230). Being cohesive in this regard therefore means the EU 
being able to take action on a variety of different foreign policies without them being in 
conflict with each other. Enabling factors for cohesiveness are meant as factors 
contributing to increase this cohesiveness of the EU and the constraining factors the 
ones working against or making it difficult. 
  
Research question one aims to constitute the background setting in order to obtain the 
knowledge for the further analysis. By actions we therefore mean to unfold previous 
events to which the EU has reacted in relation to the settlements. This research 
question will thereby establish the previous EU actorness on the settlements and is 
done to analyse how this has affected the ability for the EU to act in the present 
situation. The events will be identified in accordance with the conceptual framework and 
analysed accordingly. The research question will therefore not only unfold the EU 
actions but also other players such as Israel in relation to the same events. 
  
The second research question will continue the background setting timeline from 
research question one into 2014. The events that have occurred in 2014 will be 
analysed in detail in order to find out what the current actorness of the EU is. 
The process referred to, is the EU actorness through time and how the EU has reacted 
to events thereby constituting a process. Answering this research question will also 
entail building on the findings from the first research question. Identifying factors will 
entail looking into things that either cause or influence the EU’s actorness (Hornby 
2000: 450) such as events, relationships to other actors, and the set-up of the EU etc. 
Factors are thereby determined as events and ideas in a context in which they are 
interpreted and accorded meaning (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 24). The factors will be 
identified in accordance with the conceptual framework utilised (See Chapter 2). 
Looking into relationships will focus on both political and economic aspects also relating 
to factors and how these are interpreted in the various relationships. 
  
The third research question aims to determine what are the most important factors 
based on the findings that have been identified in the two previous research questions. 
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The most important factors will be chosen based on the findings from research question 
one and two when unfolding the current setting in which the EU finds itself in. This 
research question will therefore constitute the discussion while still analysing the EU 
actorness; how it is challenged and what opportunities there are for furthering EU 
actorness.   
Structure of the project 
This project is divided into four chapters; 
Chapter one, has included the introduction to the problem at hand, a literature review, 
the research question, as well as sub-questions to help answer the research question, 
defined the meaning of the research question as well as sub-questions, and lastly, this 
is an outline of the project. 
Chapter two entails the conceptual framework as well as the methodological 
considerations of the research including the approach. The conceptual framework will 
be the guiding tool analysing the problem at hand and the methodological 
considerations will outline how the conceptual framework and the problem at hand will 
interact in the best suitable way for this project. 
Chapter three is where the analysis will take place which is divided into three layers and 
which will be conducted in accordance with chapter two. Each layer has each their 
function for the analysis to investigate the problem at hand. 
Chapter four constitutes the conclusion of the project answering the research question.   
 
Having introduced the problem that this project wishes to address, having identified 
existing knowledge and formulated the research questions we will now move on to the 
conceptual framework. 
  
  
 13 
Chapter 2 
  
This chapter comprises two main sections, namely, the conceptual framework and the 
methodology. In the first section the concepts of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and 
‘capabilities’ will be reflected upon and they will be interpreted forming the conceptual 
framework utilised in the analysis. The three concepts will thereby together define EU 
actorness as it is dealt with in this project. The second section will entail the project’s 
methodological considerations outlining the structure of how the conceptual framework 
will be applied, the analytical approach as well as the data collection. 
  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this project builds on constructivist approaches within IR 
and is to a large extent inspired by Bretherton and Vogler’s concept of actorness (2006). 
Like Bretherton and Vogler, we also see the EU as an actor under construction in a “(...) 
a complex set of interacting processes, based on notions of presence, opportunity and 
capability that combine in varying ways to shape the EU’s external activities” (ibid.: 24).  
The concepts of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’ have inspired the creation of 
the overall conceptual framework in order to shed light on the processes that shape EU 
actorness, with special emphasis on ‘opportunity’ and ‘presence’. 
In the following, these concepts’ applicability will be discussed and exemplified by being 
put into the context of this investigation. 
Opportunity 
The concept of opportunity as presented by Bretherton and Vogler is linked to Social 
Constructivism (2006: 24). Social Constructivism is utilised in analysing the EU 
especially with regards to the internal set-up whereas the various Member States have 
different ideas, identities and interests, which are then determinants for the level of for 
example EU integration. Bretherton and Vogler looks at opportunity in relation to the 
external environment of the EU, which is why this perception of the concept is 
interesting in this investigation (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 24). In IR the EU’s external 
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opportunity structure is often debated in relation to what kind of an actor the EU 
constitute in the international system and its legitimacy (Cini and Borragan 2013: 96). 
‘Opportunity’ is by Bretherton and Vogler looked upon as the indication of the structural 
context, which frames and “encapsulates factors in the external environment which 
enable or constrain actorness” and thereby shapes EU action or inaction (Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006: 5 + 25). Factors are events and ideas that shape the external context in 
which they are interpreted and accorded meaning (ibid.: 24). ‘Opportunity’ can be used 
to look at the historical developments in the external environment of the EU in order to 
investigate a possible changed behaviour and opportunity structure. In this investigation 
it can be used to gain an insight in the pattern of actions of the EU and what the EU has 
previously done in relation to the settlements and how/if this affects the opportunity it 
has to act today. Further, an example of international awareness that could possibly 
affect EU opportunity to act, is the latest development of the US expressing in April 
2014 that there are limits to the time and effort that the US will put into the peace 
negotiations if the parties are unwilling to take “constructive steps”, which could open up 
an opportunity for an increased role in the MEPP for the EU (White 2013: 123). This 
goes well in hand with Bretherton and Vogler explaining opportunity as not exclusively 
to be used as “background setting”, but also as a dynamic process in which “ideas are 
interpreted and events accorded meaning”. It is further utilized to create shared 
understandings in a complex setting of structures and thereby shape the context of 
action (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 25). Material conditions such as the Israeli-EU 
economic relations are not separated from the shared understandings that the EU and 
Israel have of their relations to each other, but help to interpret these understandings in 
various ways. The mentioning of shared understandings in relation to opportunity also 
relates back to the internal aspects of the EU in that the opportunities for the EU to act 
increases the stronger the shared understandings among the Member States are. 
  
Normative considerations of the EU will also be looked into in relation to among others 
economic relations as these might influence the external opportunities. The normative 
principles (Manners 2009) such as democratic values that the EU is promoting when 
entering into a trade agreement are of relevance as these might result in constraints 
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towards EU action (Pace 2007: 1044). This adds on another layer of analysis and 
widens the scope of opportunity as the normativity of the EU and the wish to externalise 
this normativity in the EU’s external policies can take part in shaping the opportunity in 
the external relations. 
The concept of opportunity contributes to answering the research questions set out in 
this investigation in that it is a useful tool when trying to identify what might have 
enabled or constrained the EU’s role in relation to the settlements. Events as well as 
ideas surrounding the settlement problematic and the EU’s external actorness in 
relation to this might help unfold why the action has been taken or not taken by the EU. 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate the opportunities that the EU has had with 
regards to action in relation to the problematic and more importantly what opportunities 
it has to act now. 
Presence 
The concept of ‘presence’ utilised in this analysis is strongly inspired by the concept 
introduced by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) and conceptualizes as the ability for the EU 
to exert influence beyond its borders by virtue of its existence (Bretherton & Vogler 
2006: 27). It includes several aspects of looking at identity, for example, by looking at 
other actors’ perceptions and expectations, which interact and together influence the 
presence of the EU and EU actorness, but also the material existence of the EU 
(Bretherton & Vogler 2006). Following the separation of material matter from social 
processes, emphasis is on a differentiation between the material existence of the EU 
and the shared understanding that gives meaning to what the EU is and what it does 
(Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 27). The material existence in this analysis will refer only to 
the EU as an economic integrating entity. The material existence of the EU as an 
economic integrated entity cannot be excluded from the shared understanding that give 
meaning to what the EU is and what it does and it also influences how other actors 
might perceive the EU. Adding to the inspiration from Bretherton & Vogler (2006), the 
understanding of strategic culture within IR will also help enhance the understanding of 
presence, especially in regards to what can be expected by the EU. Strategic culture 
refers to a set of ideas that influence how others expect one to act (Jackson & 
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Sørensen 2010). Manners  (2002) works with the concept of NPE and his notion of the 
normative values of the EU and how they influence its actions will also be added to the 
understanding of the concept ‘presence’ in this analysis. The concept of ‘presence’ in 
short, thus includes; 1. the material existence, which has been compressed to refer only 
to the EU´s presence as an economic power, 2. the identity of the EU in foreign policy 
based on a long lasting set of ideas that influence others’ perceptions and expectations 
of how the EU will act and, 3. the unintended external consequences of internal EU 
action in relation to the settlements (Bretherton & Vogler 2013). The definition of 
Presence has thus been elaborated by the understanding of strategic culture and 
normative values, which help enhance the concept as first, inspired by Bretherton & 
Vogler. Each point will be elaborated below; 
  
The material existence of the EU is defined as the ”de facto existence of an EU (...) 
which has a wealth and size (...) which presence in the international system only 
increases by the continuation of its enlargement” (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 28). This 
implies that the EU is an economic entity that continues to expand and because the EU 
is the biggest single market to be accessed, also by Israel, the material existence in this 
analysis will be compressed to only encompass the fact that the EU is an economic 
integrating entity able to attract cooperating partners. 
  
Another aspect of ‘presence’ is the “shared understanding that gives meaning to what 
the EU is and what it does” (ibid. 2006). This means, how other actors perceive the EU 
and how the EU perceives itself, but also how this affects the expectations others have 
of the EU and how this influence their behaviour accordingly. The EU´s self-perception 
as a promoter of peace, human rights and the rule of law could in this respect have an 
influence on how others expect them to act and how the EU intends to act. In other 
words, the values of the EU could predispose it to act normatively and is therefore 
relevant to keep in mind (Manners 2002: 242). The notion of strategic culture refers to 
the way in which ideas are able to influence the foreign policy and how countries over 
time develop a set of long lasting ideas that tell something about how they will act within 
foreign affairs, will also help us to understand how Israel perceives the identity of the EU 
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within foreign affairs, and thereby expect the EU to act (Jackson & Sørensen 2010: 
256). Linking it back to Manners (2002) the EU has incorporated a set of normative 
values, which can also be said to count as a set of long lasting ideas that could have an 
influence on how one can expect the EU to act. Perceptions and expectations of the EU 
from other actors are important as they have the power to change behaviours 
(Bretherton & Vogler 2013). In line with Bretherton and Vogler the perception of a 
unified and coherent EU further enhance the concept of presence (2013: 266). 
 
Bretherton and Vogler also speak about how internal action can have unintended 
external consequences (2006: 27). They refer it to internal policies having a direct 
external effect but we argue that it can be utilised in other ways, and still be relevant 
(ibid: 28.). In this relation, the communication between national diplomacies of the EU 
and Israel could have the power to warp the way in which the EU´s actual stand is 
perceived and thus unintentionally influence how Israel will expect the EU to act upon its 
official statement. 
Capability 
Capability is about internal factors and how these are utilised as well as to what extent 
they are utilised to respond to external factors i.e. opportunities and expectations 
(Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 5). In other words, it refers to EU policy processes, which 
either constrain or enable external action addressing both the formulation of policies as 
well as availability of appropriate policy instruments (ibid.: 29). Internally, capability can 
be challenged by competing discourses among the Member States, and is therefore 
closely linked to the level of competence of the EU and thereby to what extent the EU is 
able to act in unity (ibid.: 29). This is also strongly linked to the intergovernmentalist 
approach inspired by the realist or neo-realist understandings of rational and self-
interested states looking to ensure their survival in an anarchical system (Cini & Perez 
2013: 72). In relation to the EU, this means that the states are participating in the EU 
mainly for self-gain, which can at times result in difficulties when the EU is to speak with 
one voice. This could be exemplified with differing approaches among the Member 
States towards Israel and Palestine, respectively (Seeberg 2009: 3). We will, however, 
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not dwell with opinions of respective Member States in relation to the settlements, but 
depart on the basis that they are all subject to UN resolutions and therefore in practice 
share the same understanding and take the same stand. We do, however, argue that 
the concept of capability cannot be left out in an analysis on EU actorness entirely. 
Noting the difficulties formulating policies due to competing Member States’ interests 
this is still important. To help us understand these difficulties, Bretherton and Vogler 
(2013: 382-85) developed the notion of coherence problems divided into three 
dimensions; vertical, horizontal and institutional coherence. ‘Horizontal coherence’ 
refers to the coherence between different levels of policy making meaning how the 
external policies of the Member States is complementing the EU’s policies, but vary 
from different areas of policies due to competences (ibid.: 383). ‘Vertical coherence’ 
refers to the coherence between different policy sectors such as trade and Human 
Rights. This form of coherence is difficult to achieve due to the complexity of the 
institutional environment within the EU (ibid.: 382). Lastly, the ‘Institutional Coherence’ 
within and between institutions refers to a function or mechanism, which help to ensure 
coordination between the different institutions (Ibid: 384). Although this will not be 
directly applied in the analysis an understanding of this could prove useful when 
analysing the EU´s capability to act.   
  
Furthermore, in the context of ‘capability’ it is interesting to look at into what policy 
instruments are actually available for the EU to make use of in its external action. 
Bretherton and Vogler mention in this regard e.g. political (diplomacy/negotiation), 
economic (incentives/sanctions) and military means (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 33). 
Meunier & Nicolaidis state that “The use of trade to achieve non-trade objectives has 
pride of place as a potential instrument of Europe's Geopolitical power” (2006: 912). The 
EU competences in the area of trade has been transferred from a national level to a 
supranational level and thereby, it has the ability to negotiate externally with one voice 
(ibid. 2006). The EU being Israel’s largest trading partner could mean that this specific 
aspect is of high relevance to look into. Furthermore, Smith speaks of policy instruments 
available for the EU as “those means used by policy-makers in their attempts to get 
other international actors to do what they would not otherwise do” (Smith 2008: 54). She 
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identifies three key instruments available for the EU to use in its external policy i.e. 
economic, diplomatic and military instruments, and refers in relation to the first to 
agreements made between the EU and third countries in which she mentions the 
element of conditionality (Smith 2008: 54-73). These understandings of policy 
instruments will help getting a better and deeper understanding of the instruments 
available by offering concrete instruments that we can then look into whether have been 
used by the EU or not. We are interested in looking upon these instruments in the 
external action/inaction of the EU in the context of the settlements. This can help unfold 
the cohesiveness in that it can dig into the instruments and the extent to which the EU 
has utilised these. 
  
Examples of how each concept holds relevance in relation to the settlement problematic 
and how they can help investigating the EU's actorness in this regard have now been 
mentioned. In the following the methodological considerations will be explained 
including the structure, approach and data collection. 
  
Methodology 
This section will first outline the methodological considerations behind the analysis, 
together with its structure and how the conceptual framework will be utilised 
accordingly. Secondly, the analytical method, which has been developed to utilise the 
conceptual framework, is visualised by a constructed model and explained. Thirdly, the 
empirical foundation for the analysis will be elaborated. 
  
This analysis is a qualitative analysis that sees EU actorness as a social phenomenon 
and seeks to describe and understand it in relation to the Israeli settlements by the use 
of social concepts and especially the understanding of social processes (Delanty & 
Strydom, 2010). 
Being aware that a circular relationship exists between the three concepts that make up 
the conceptual framework, neither one of them can be addressed as the cause or the 
effect for EU actorness, but must be viewed in a relation where each one affect the 
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other. This means that we as researchers must engage in a reflexive process (ibid.: 
370), both when addressing the concepts’ relation to each other, but also how each step 
in this circular relation leads to a possible effect on EU actorness. Empirical examples 
that are utilised by the conceptual framework and used to emphasise its relation to EU 
actorness is likewise based on a reflexive choice by the researchers. We as socially 
constructed human beings cannot approach the data entirely objectively and may 
understand the data differently from how others may understand it, which ultimately can 
affect the conclusion of the research (ibid.: 370). This again entails a high level of 
reflexivity when approaching the data which is necessary to be viewed from different 
angles before concluding on its meaning (ibid.). 
Structure and approach 
The analysis is structured into three layers in which the conceptual framework will be 
utilised. The three layers each represent one of the research questions in which the 
analysis will be conducted to answer them. Furthermore, the findings from each of these 
layers will contribute to the main conclusion answering the main research question as 
presented in chapter 1. 
1. The first layer will constitute an overview of the EU’s previous actorness in 
relation to the settlements, which has an effect on the current possibility for 
actorness and which is necessary to create a comprehensive understanding of 
the current situation. This will work as a funnel analytically approaching the 
current situation leading to the second layer, which will; 
2. Analyse the EU actorness during 2014 highlighting developments in relation to 
the settlements. The analysis will be structured similarly to layer one in order to 
create a meaningful transition and organisation of the analysis. Layer two will 
further focus on the current EU actorness which will then lead to; 
3. The third layer of the analysis, which will constitute a discussion of the 
constraints and opportunities to EU’s current actorness towards the settlements. 
This will done by looking at the findings from the previous two layers discussing 
their outcome, interaction as well as the instruments available to the EU at 
present. 
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The following model has been made to visualise the structure and analytical framework; 
 
  
Moving from the outside and inwards towards the middle in the model, the first circle 
represents the first layer of analysis. Previous events relevant to the current 
circumstances will be subject of analysis, however, the conceptual framework will be 
used mainly as a descriptive tool in layer one with less emphasis on the analytical 
angle. However, since these events have already occurred they include actions and 
reactions with the capabilities available at the time that together have created 
opportunities and constraints for the EU to act at present. The arrows moving from the 
first layer of analysis to the second layer illustrate the effect that these events have had. 
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The second circle, represents a more comprehensive layer of analysis. The current 
situation and events in 2014 will be dealt with in detail. The causality is very explicit and 
not one action or perception can be said to constitute the cause and effect for another. 
Following the vertical arrow from EU identity down to the opportunity shows how the 
overall presence of the EU has an effect on the opportunities and hindrances for its 
actorness. Likewise, the level of opportunity to act has an effect on the overall presence 
of the EU in the way these are utilised by the EU. 
Following the horizontal arrow between other actors’ perception and behaviours towards 
the EU and EU action; it shows that what the EU does affect other actors’ perceptions of 
the EU, and how the behaviour of these actors can likewise change how the EU acts. 
Both ends of the horizontal arrow constitute part of presence in the way that they 
influence the overall presence of the EU. Other actors’ perceptions and behaviours can 
be said to exist externally and what the EU does and how it acts externally, can be said 
to exist on the basis of its internal capabilities. Hence, here the policy instruments 
described earlier, is important. 
  
None of the four notions in the model stand alone in constructing EU actorness, but are 
interrelated in various ways and together create an understanding of EU actorness. 
The notions also exist in a circular relation or in a triangular relation where the 
opportunity structure is affected by an interaction of the other three aspects. The 
opportunity structure can also exist externally from presence and influence each of the 
two notions on the horizontal line and thereby also the overall presence of the EU. 
Another example of how the notions in the model are interconnected is the triangular 
relation where EU action represents ways in which the EU can gain advantage from its 
presence and respond to an opportunity (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 29). 
The model is constructed to this specific analysis but can be altered and used 
answering different research questions. 
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Data collection 
This research is based mainly on qualitative data. As a starting point snowball sampling 
was utilised to create an overview on existing work relating to the identified problem 
done by following references especially in academic reports leading to more relevant 
existing research (Johnson & Reynolds 2008: 242). In order to create an overview and 
understanding of existing data a literature review was conducted allowing for a critical 
selection of relevant data to be used in this particular research (Somekh & Lewin 2011: 
16-7). This further identified where this research will add on new knowledge to the 
existing work done. 
  
Secondary data will be the main source using running records such as the European 
Union External Action (EEAS) website (Johnson & Reynolds 2008: 271-3). As this 
research is focused on the Israeli settlements the data collection for the analysis will be 
quite narrow in that we will mainly look into data directly linked to this specific 
problematic. However, as the settlement problematic is deeply rooted in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute we find it necessary to look into previous action by the EU, which involves a 
great amount of research made over a long period of time. In order to systematically 
organise this data and test its relevance we have partly utilised a paper trail making a 
timeline both in layer one and layer two of the analysis (George & Bennett 2005). 
  
The data that we will look into is official statements, declarations, opinions and 
speeches made by the EU, news articles, bilateral agreements between the EU and 
Israel as well as books on the conflict. Utilising running records means that the data is 
easily accessible through websites and it allows to go back in time, however, it is with 
the constraint that what is accessible online is only what e.g. the EU decides to upload 
and therefore carefully selected data (Johnson & Reynolds 2008: 277). This might 
influence the data available, and we will therefore make sure to seek information from 
other sources as well such as news articles to get a more nuanced perspective. 
When investigating the relationship between the EU and Israel we will look into e.g. 
trade agreements made between the two parties. Also, public articles from Israel about 
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the EU and information from the EU-Israel delegation on the bilateral relationships will 
be looked into. 
  
The conceptual framework and the methodological considerations guiding the analysis 
have now been presented. The analytical method have been visualised in a constructed 
model and explained together with its embedded structure and the main method of data 
collection has been presented. The following chapter contains the analysis, which is 
divided into three sections representing each layer of analysis in accordance with the 
above-mentioned structure and approach. 
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Chapter 3 
  
We will now move on to the analysis starting with layer one looking into past events that 
may have an influence on EU actorness at present. Subsequently, we will move on to 
layer two in which will situate around events in 2014 identifying factors that have had an 
impact on the EU’s current actorness. Finally, the third layer will both discuss the 
findings from the previous two layers as well as identify and discuss enabling and 
constraining factors to EU actorness. 
  
Layer 1 
Layer one of the analysis will mainly focus on events that have occurred in relation to 
the settlements, but will also discuss the EU’s involvement and place in the conflict to 
gain an insight in both the developments in the conflict and the EU’s actorness towards 
it relating directly to the settlements. The layer has been divided in sub-sections with the 
first sub-section laying out the overall context. 
 
The context   
The conflict and the MEPP have been on the EU’s agenda since the 1990s (Keukeleire 
& MacNaughtan 2008: 282). In 1967 the Six Day War broke out and ended with an 
Israeli victory resulting in Israel occupying the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and 
the Sinai Peninsula (Encyclopædia Britannica, 05.10.15). Numerous of Israeli 
settlements and a constant dispute in/over the aforementioned areas are still a reality 
today. 
The settlement expansions are highly placed on the EU’s agenda, as the EU in 
company of other international actors perceives the construction of settlements as an 
opposing element to the peace negotiations (EEAS 11.01.14). The EU, then the EC, 
has since 1967 in accordance with UN resolution 242 demanded Israel to leave the 
occupied territories, and urged all states in the area to recognise the pre-1967 borders 
(Woolf 2005: 20). Ever since 1967 Israeli settlements have expanded, and in 1977 
settlements became the official policy of the Israeli government as a mean to expand 
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(ibid.: 20). Israel has argued that the settlements were not in violation of UN resolution 
282 in the case of neither the West Bank nor the Gaza strip as it did not belong to a 
state prior to the occupation (ibid.: 21). The opposing perceptions of the settlements are 
what especially challenge the intended EU actorness. The conflict constitutes a dynamic 
process and the EU constantly face an ever-changing external environment to which it 
has to take a stand impacting the possibility to act, and the opportunity structure 
continuously change as a consequence. In 2001, violent escalations in the conflict 
resulted in Israel constructing a security fence around the controlled areas including the 
settlements, which isolated them further from the Palestinians (ibid.: 50). The fence was 
a serious obstacle for the peace process as the Israelis from then regarded the 
settlements as part of Israel and the withdrawal from these was no longer looked at as 
an option in the peace negotiations from the side of Israel (ibid.). That Israel built this 
physical obstacle impacted the EU’s opportunity structure in that more factors were now 
present which constrained the EU’s opportunity to act and the EU had to take this into 
consideration and accord it meaning in order to act towards it in a meaningful way. 
  
Shared understandings within the EU 
The EU-Israeli relationship has since 1947 been rather close in particular due to the 
responsibility carried by especially Germany after World War II and the Holocaust 
(Seeberg 2009: 2). However, some EU member states such as France have been more 
pro-Arab (ibid.: 3). The capability of the EU to act towards Israel has therefore in some 
circumstances challenged the EU’s opportunity structure due to internal disagreements 
resulting in the Member States not having shared understandings on how the EU should 
be positioned in the conflict. However, in relation to the Israeli settlements the EU has 
continuously underlined that these are illegal under international law, and the EU, in 
recent years mainly through the HR, has spoken on behalf of all its Member States 
condemning the settlements. The Member States were united and interpreted the EU 
position together reaching common ground. This was an enabling factor for EU 
actorness as this proved a shared understanding, which could potentially lead to action. 
Furthermore, it enhanced the EU’s shared identity, which positively affected the EU’s 
presence as an external actor both due to the EU’s self-perception as well as how it was 
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perceived by other actors. The EU’s internal capabilities have been strengthened since 
the establishment of the HR function and as a result, the EU’s capacity to speak with 
one voice in its external action has improved both the EU presence as well as its 
opportunity to formulate a collective opinion on external events. This has given the 
opportunity for the EU to act as a unified actor internationally (Soetendorp 2002: 284). 
The concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘opportunity’ are strongly linked in that shared 
understandings creating a common identity increase both the presence and opportunity 
for the EU to act externally. 
  
Criticisms of the EU position in the MEPP 
The EU having a different approach to the peace negotiations than the US has created 
obstacles for EU involvement in the MEPP (Soetendorp 2002: 284). This was for 
example seen when the US kept the EU as much as possible on the sideline in the 
Madrid peace negotiations in 1991 (ibid.: 286). The US was concerned giving the EU 
too much of a say in the negotiations as the two parties at the time had different 
approaches. The EU had a multilateral approach focusing on an overall peace 
agreement involving all parties and the US focused more on “bilateral agreements 
between Israel and its Arab-neighbours” (ibid.: 284). The EU and US did not share the 
same understanding on how to approach the conflict, which impacted negatively on 
both the EU presence and opportunity. The US being the main negotiator and largest 
actor in the conflict decreased the EU’s opportunity to act as well as its presence due 
the US perceiving the EU’s presence as an obstacle (ibid.). The internal capabilities 
were also a constraining factor to EU actorness in that the EU did not have the 
possibility to implement their approach to the conflict due to how its presence was 
perceived. 
 
Israel has criticised the EU of being too pro-Arabic, which was for example underlined in 
2003 when Sharon, the then Israeli Prime Minister, expressed concern on the EU 
position in the peace negotiations with harsh rhetoric on the EU not being balanced 
favouring the Palestinians (Miller 2006: 642). The EU presence was by Israel negatively 
associated with, which would also have a negative impact on the opportunity for the EU 
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to act, if Israel e.g. put a stop to the agreements between the two parties. Israel did as 
the US perceive the EU negatively and did therefore not invite the EU into the 
negotiations, which consequently affected the EU’s opportunity to become an actor in 
the conflict. The diplomatic instruments employed by the EU was thereby less 
successful and effective. Israel has further criticised the EU for being a self-serving 
mediator looking at economic self-gain (Soetendorp 2002: 286), which relates to the 
strategic culture of the EU being one of the largest economic blocs in the world seeking 
to increase economic involvement and gain. Being one of the largest economic blocs in 
the world is a direct link to the EU’s presence being a factor determining how the EU is 
perceived by its mere virtue of existence. Israel did therefore expect the EU to act for 
self-gain and perceived the EU as having a negative role in relation to Israel’s own 
interests. The EU presence and opportunity were therefore limited by the mistrust that 
both Israel and the US had in the EU, which limited its role in the MEPP and thereby its 
possibility to influence the Israeli settlement policy, significantly (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan 2008: 287). 
  
Role and capabilities of the EU 
In the Oslo peace negotiations in 1993 the role of the EU was still limited, but the EU did 
have suggestions for a peace settlement and suggested prior to the Oslo negotiations 
regional cooperation in key areas as well as the establishment of a Middle East 
economic area (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 285). After the Oslo Accords the EU 
had the possibility to further elaborate on this by playing a role in established multilateral 
working groups focusing on areas such as infrastructure (ibid.). Playing a role in the 
working groups was an event enabling the opportunity for the EU to become more than 
a spectator, and to utilise its internal capabilities externalising its shared understanding 
on the approach to the conflict. Also, during and in the aftermath of Oslo the EU saw an 
opportunity to increase its role in the peace process through financial contributions, 
which is one of the EU’s main instruments due to its economic position in the world 
(Soetendorp 2002: 288). This instrument proved successful and made the EU the 
largest donor of aid to the Palestinians contributing to the stabilisation of the West Bank 
and Gaza building the capacity of the Palestinians to take an active part in the peace 
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process (ibid.: 288). The EU acted on opportunity, and applied an economic instrument 
in the form of aid, which had a strong impact on the presence of the EU. The EU 
entered the scene and established itself as an actor. In relation to the economic 
involvement of the EU, Soetendorp made an interesting point looking at the “importance 
of the distinction between diplomatic and external economic activities. It was because of 
the economic involvement of the EU, not its CFSP activities, that the EU got a say in the 
peace process” (Soetendorp 2002: 295). The opportunity for the EU utilising an 
economic instrument increased its presence as well as its future opportunities resulting 
in a good position and a clear improvement in the EU actorness. 
  
After the collapse of the Oslo Accords the EU revised its approach to the conflict and 
realised that it had to take an active part in the peace-making by among others 
diplomatic activities being more involved in the peace process employing special 
envoys as well as focusing on the military security dimension (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan 2008: 286). The EU acted on the opportunity to take active part in the 
peace negotiations and increased its capability measures accordingly by applying new 
instruments, being economic, diplomatic and military as mentioned above. The EU 
strived to obtain a more significant role and accordingly became more confident 
increasing its presence. The EU actorness in relation to the peace negotiations has 
been on the rise and the EU has continuously attempted to play a larger role 
(Soetendorp 2002: 289). 
  
The EU and the international community 
The US approach to EU involvement in the MEPP changed throughout the years, and 
the concept of ‘presence’ became especially significant when looking at the EU and its 
alliance with other international actors. 
In 2001, the Mitchell report was made by the Sharm El-Sheikh fact finding-committee 
consisting of the HR of the EU, Javier Solana, and representatives from the US, Norway 
and Turkey (Suleyman et al. 30.04.01). The report contained recommendations on the 
way forward of the MEPP and among others stated that in order to rebuild confidence 
the “Government of Israel should freeze all settlement activity, including the “natural 
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growth” of existing settlements” (ibid.). The report was a sign of a collective wish to 
resolve the conflict among actors in the international community, with the EU as one of 
the authors. The EU and the international community started to form shared 
understandings on the conflict and the approach in the peace negotiations, including the 
EU. The increased the presence of the EU alongside other international actors had a 
positive effect on the EU’s opportunity for involvement as well as action. 
In 2002, the EU became part of the Middle East Quartet, referred to hereafter as the 
Quartet, consisting of the US, UN and Russia with the main objective of bringing lasting 
peace to the Middle East and an attempt to make a coordinated international effort 
(Seeberg 2009: 3). The Quartet being made up of some of the most powerful actors in 
the world creating a shared understanding on how to deal with the conflict collectively 
shaping the context of action relates directly to the concept of ‘opportunity’. They 
attempted with shared effort to establish themselves in unity and influence the 
developments in the conflict and the MEPP. Furthermore, the EU being part of the 
Quartet significantly influenced its presence in collective action in the international 
community. The capabilities of the Quartet have, however, been limited and the action 
made has been mainly financial aid, diplomatic meetings and the development of the 
“Roadmap for Peace” (FFOG 02.10.14). The Quartet’s capabilities in relation to the 
settlements have especially been limited due to the differences among the members of 
the Quartet. The roadmap stated that all Israeli settlements constructed after 2001 was 
to be demolished (Woolf 2005: 49), which by the EU was considered as the main point 
of reference in its statements. But, the US was reluctant to make an active effort to 
implement the plan and put pressure on Israel, which resulted in the roadmap being 
merely paperwork (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 286). The reluctance of the US to 
put pressure on Israel was an example that might have weakened the EU’s presence as 
well as opportunity to act, as this has made the roadmap and the joint effort look less 
serious. The expectations of the accomplishment of the roadmap therefore seemed to 
be perceived differently by the EU and the US, and the shared understandings on how 
to act as a united international community did not seem shared after all. The EU and the 
US have become more of allies instead of being opponents in the process (ibid.: 290), 
which has increased the EU presence and opportunity in the conflict, however, the lack 
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of action from the side of the US has consequently influenced the role of the EU 
negatively.   
  
The EU-Israeli relations 
Israel has during the years attempted to play an active part in the peace negotiations 
making plans of withdrawing from parts of the occupied territories, which was for 
example seen in 1994 when Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip and from parts of the 
West Bank. The international community’s involvement in the peace negotiations can 
thereby be argued to have impacted Israel’s actions, and the EU has taken part in 
shaping the actions of Israel. This points in the direction of an increased presence in 
that the perceptions and expectations that Israel had of the international community 
including the EU had the power to change the behaviour of Israel. Based on among 
others the sharing of common interests with the EU, Israel was in 1994 granted ‘special 
status’ in the EU (EC 10.12.94). Although the peace process later halted, Israel being 
granted ‘special status’ could be a way of the EU to acknowledge the initiative taken in 
the first place by Israel. This can be seen as an opportunity that the EU took in order to 
both increase its presence in its relation to Israel and increasing its material existence 
applying an economic instrument by upgrading Israel-EU trade relations. Despite 
escalations in the conflict the EU-Israel Association Agreement entered into force in 
1995 forming the legal basis of EU-Israeli cooperation and by 1996 Israel was fully 
associated with the EU’s research programmes (Pardo 2009: 52). A similar move 
occurred in 2009 when the Israeli-EU cooperation deepened further after Israel agreed 
to a 10 month settlement freeze (Ravid 25.11.09 & BBC 29.07.13), and further 
deepening also happened in the area of agriculture the same year (EEAS 3 of 6). Again 
it seemed that the EU saw an opportunity to deepen its relations with Israel at the same 
time as Israel agreed to contribute to the peace process. This goes well in hand with 
Hollis arguing that the EU can impact Israel’s settlement policy by offering Israel a 
special relationship (Hollis 2004: 191). The above indicated that Israel and the EU were 
continuously becoming closer in a variety of fields both politically and economically 
(EEAS 21.06.00). The EU’s presence and opportunities in relation to Israel can 
therefore be argued to be looked at from two sides based on the above findings; how it 
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is looked upon by Israel in the MEPP and in their bilateral trade relations. It is also clear 
to see that the EU has constantly interpreted the events and accorded them meaning 
resulting in acting upon the opportunity there was to increase and deepen the 
relationship to Israel. 
  
Even though Israel and the EU had established close ties it did not change the EU 
position on the settlements, which was an obstacle in the EU-Israeli relationship. The 
EU and Israel had two completely different approaches to this problematic. In 1998, the 
British Foreign Minister, then acting as the EU Council president, criticised the 
expansion of Israeli settlements, which provoked the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, 
to the extent that he cancelled a planned dinner between the two (Aoun 2003: 302). 
Netanyahu later stated that he wanted the EU to stop meddling in the peace process, 
decreasing the EU presence and opportunity in the MEPP being perceived negatively 
by Israel (ibid.). The relation between the two on the issue of settlements continued to 
decrease especially when the EU later the same year “proposed on judicial grounds to 
stop applying ordinary customs advantages to Israeli exports originating from the 
Jewish settlements” and as a response Netanyahu warned the EU that it would have 
consequences on the Israeli employment policy favouring the Palestinians (ibid.:302). 
The EU underlined its stand on the settlements, which in the eyes of Israel decreased 
the EU’s presence, however, in relation to the EU’s self-perception it strengthened its 
presence. This event in the form of a statement had various impacts on the EU 
presence and opportunity, which was a consequence of the MEPP being so closely 
linked to the settlements. In 2001 the Commission concluded that in the 1995 
Association Agreement products originating from the Jewish settlements were not 
eligible for preferential treatment, and thereby concluded on legal grounds proving its 
stand on the issue of the settlements (Hirsch 2002: 587). This mixed the two-sided 
relationship between Israel and the EU blurring the lines in their relationship and the 
EU’s presence in the eyes of Israel. Israel using ‘consequence’ rhetoric on the EU’s 
statement showed that Israel was not intimidated by the EU. What was also interesting 
was that Israel did not threaten the EU in their trade relations, however, targeted the 
MEPP and one of the EU’s main priorities of building the capacity of the Palestinians. 
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This could indicate how important the bilateral relations are to Israel being a material 
consideration that could be the underlying reason for Israel not wanting to mention them 
too much in their counter response. The EU opportunity to act in relation to the bilateral 
relations can therefore be argued not to be impacted negatively as such. The EU 
position in relation to Israel has been rather controversial and the EU has throughout 
the years been severely criticised for having condemned the settlements disassociating 
itself from the expansions but yet still trading with Israel (Gee 2013). This criticism 
negatively affects the presence of the EU being perceived as self-contradictory, which 
consequently could lead to other international actors not having faith in the EU’s role in 
the MEPP. 
  
Normative values 
One thing is the economic relationship with third states and another is the EU’s wish to 
externalise its core normative values. The EU tries to promote these normative values 
through its agreements with third parties, which includes political aspects in the 
agreements. In all the agreements made between the EU and a third state there is a 
consideration in the preamble “CONSIDERING the importance which the Parties attach 
to the principle of economic freedom and to the principles of the United Nations Charter, 
particularly the observance of human rights and democracy, which form the very basis 
of the Association” (EEAS 21.06.00). The nature of the IPC being very violent offers a 
challenge to these norms, which are based on human rights as well as democratic 
values. In a 2012 Human Rights Watch report, Israeli human rights violations were 
reported, namely the ‘Right to Freedom of Movement’ and ‘Right to Family Unity’ (HRW 
2012). The report was based on the occupied territories, and documented the Israeli 
obligations to adhere to international humanitarian law. Even though this did not 
document violations directly related to the EU-Israeli agreement, it testified that Israel 
violated human rights, which the EU should ideally pay attention to. However, the EU 
continuously deepened its bilateral relations with Israel even though Israel compromised 
with core normative values of the EU impacting the identity of the EU in the eyes of 
other actors resulting in a decreased presence. The opportunity for the EU could as a 
consequence decrease as it can be perceived as incohesive in its external action and 
 34 
inconsistency seems to appear between the normative shared understandings and 
material considerations. The human rights clause, which has been incorporated in all 
EU agreements since 1995 allows the EU to denounce or suspend an agreement if the 
country entered into the agreement with, violates human rights or democratic principles 
(Smith 2008: 56). This is an enabling instrument for the EU to use in its external action, 
however, no agreement between Israel and the EU has so far been suspended. 
  
New approaches and a new role 
From 2005, the EU started focusing more on security and in 2006 the EU sent 7000 
troops to support a UN force to oversee the fragile ceasefire (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughtan 2008: 287). The EU started applying more versatile instruments 
increasing its presence in the conflict. The internal capabilities affected the opportunity 
to act, which the EU took. 
More events occurred in 2005 when Israel carried out a unilateral disengagement plan 
from the Gaza i.e. relocating settlements based in the Gaza strip (PMOCD 04.06.05), 
which was a plan supported by the EU as well as the international community (Miller 
2006: 649). The EU put up criteria for Israel to follow and insisted on their 
implementation in order for the EU to support the disengagement plans (ibid.: 649). The 
criteria underlined the focus of the EU representing both sides as well as showing a 
more self-confident EU. The criteria further proved a confident EU daring to involve itself 
in the MEPP increasing its presence by acting on the opportunity to externalise its 
shared understandings utilising the internal capability in the form of a diplomatic 
instrument. The disengagement plan was perceived by the EU as a positive step, and 
the EU took the opportunity to support Israel and praise the, then Israeli leader, Sharon, 
making sure to make public statements to make their action visible internationally (ibid.: 
650). This improved the bilateral relations between the EU and Israel, which was also 
enhanced as the EU subsequently started putting pressure on Abbas, the 
representative of the Palestinians (ibid.: 650). The presence of the EU had turned more 
positive in relation to Israel also on the settlements, and the EU took the opportunity to 
act in favour of this relation. The EU and Israel got closer in understanding each other, 
which enabled EU action positively affecting the EU actorness. 
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The EU ‘on ground’ 
In relation to EU’s physical presence in Israel and the occupied territories several 
reports have been made by the delegations on the condemnation of the settlements 
underlining the EU’s use of diplomatic instruments. To mention an example, a 2011 
informal report was made by the EU heads of mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah (A3. 
EU Heads of Mission 2012). It included opinions and recommendations on EU policy on 
the situation. The report expressed a degree of frustration as the delegations wished for 
more authority to take direct action (ibid.). In the report the Israeli settlement expansion 
was criticised as undermining the Palestinians whom it was argued were getting ever 
more detached from each other as a consequence (A3. EU Heads of Mission 2012: 
224). It further stated that Israel had breached its commitment to the peace process by 
these actions, and that the breach could have consequences regionally and globally as 
the conflict could escalate again. Recommendations made in the report were among 
others that all EU financial measures that could relate to settlement activity should be 
stopped, and that the Commission should be encouraged to propose EU legislation 
preventing financial transactions in support of settlement activity (A3. EU Heads of 
Mission 2012: 231-32). The opinion of the report was clear and the missions in 
Ramallah and Jerusalem, respectively, agreed on the need for EU action and increased 
EU presence in East Jerusalem in order to deal with the settlement issues (Ellegaard 
12.01.12). The capabilities of the EU delegations on ground seems rather limited; 
however, their presence opens up the opportunity for the EU to be well-informed and to 
make an informed opinion on the settlements. This, from the outset, seems to be an 
enabling factor for EU actorness getting first-hand information from the delegations, 
which should ideally substantiate EU opinions and actions. But, the report was never 
officially published pointing in the direction of the EU being afraid to be too strict in its 
statements and actions towards Israel. The shared understandings on how to act within 
the EU, in this context the delegations and Brussels, seemed unclear, and the EU 
identity fragmented. In relation to an announced settlement expansion in East 
Jerusalem, Ashton, the then HR/VP of the EU, issued a statement condemning this 
underlining the EU and Quartet position on settlements, however, no concrete actions 
 36 
from the side of the EU or the findings from the internal report were mentioned (EEAS 
06.04.11). 
In 2013, the consuls of the EU in Jerusalem and Ramallah again issued a report, this 
time calling for “imposing economic sanctions against Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem (...)” (Xinhua 27.02.13). The delegations called upon the EU 
to act and utilise instruments that had not previously been used in the EU external 
action in the conflict. Even though it was unclear whether it was a direct response to the 
calls for action, the EU did take some action the same year by developing guidelines on 
“the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel 
since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 
2014 onwards” in order to respect EU positions (EEAS 19.07.13). This could be argued 
to increase the presence of the EU proving a shared identity of the EU. The EU did take 
external action, perhaps due to an opportunity based on information from the 
delegations. Israel strongly opposed the guidelines stating that the EU was trying to 
force their position on the settlements onto Israel in an unhealthy manner (Rottbøll 
17.07.13). This was an attempt of the EU to take concrete economic instruments into 
use acting on its position towards the settlements not letting the settlements expand 
with no consequences. The cooperation between Israel and the EU had been 
continuing even though Israel had continuously built settlements, and it seems that the 
EU’s patience was running out and stepped into character, which underlines the 
presence that the EU perceives itself to have and strives to strengthen.   
  
EU official statements 
The EU has continuously issued statements, conclusions, notices etc., on the MEPP 
and the settlements both on behalf of itself and as part of the Quartet (EEAS 10.12.12 
and EEAS 16.04.12). Every time Israel has announced a settlement expansion, the EU 
has issued a statement condemning it, which has been the prompt response. From 
2012-2014 numerous of statements was issued on the condemnation of the settlements 
from the HR/VP of the EU, which clearly underpin that the Israeli settlement policy has 
not halted, but rather continued to expand. 
 37 
The EU position towards the building of settlements has not changed, but remained the 
same (EEAS 21.03.14). The guidelines formulated in 2013 were the first active move, 
which could result in severe consequences for Israel with the underlying implication that 
if adhering to them, Israel would also indirectly acknowledge that the settlements are 
not a legal part of Israel. This move was a sign of seriousity from the EU and the way it 
perceived itself taking concrete action. The EU also stepped up with regards to its 
presence in that it potentially would be looked upon both by Israel as well as the 
international community as a serious actor putting action behind its words. The impact 
of these actions and whether they will influence Israel’s perception and expectations of 
the EU to the extent that the EU will change Israeli behaviour has still not proved 
successful. This again points in the direction that the EU presence in the eyes of Israel 
with regards to the settlements is rather trivial, and the EU opportunity and instruments 
utilised have not been successful. 
  
The EU has not always been a meaningful actor in the peace process, but has during 
the years put a lot of effort into becoming more significant increasing its presence, 
seeking opportunity and applying new policy instruments when an opportunity occurred. 
There has been a number of challenges in terms of e.g. its internal capacity to act, the 
international community’s perception of the EU and its ties to the various actors in the 
conflict. In 2014 a number of events occurred to which the EU had to act, which layer 
two will now proceed to. 
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Layer 2 
  
Layer two will continue the timeframe from January 2014 onwards. With the knowledge 
from layer one in mind, layer two will focus on the current involvement of the EU in the 
conflict analysing key events that have an impact on its actorness. The conceptual 
framework will be utilised and the events analysed in relation to the understanding of 
EU´s presence, opportunity and capability.  
  
The context 
The 2014 context can be partly divided into three phases. The first part of the year 
mostly evolved around diplomatic statements condemning the settlements, and no 
direct actions were made against them. Spring and summer 2014, introduced some 
changes in the external environment, which have influenced the opportunity structure of 
the EU, and consequently also the events in the last phase of 2014. The last phase of 
2014 till date seems to introduce a new EU approach towards the conflict and the 
settlements. A new approach, which might make the EU capable of responding to its 
new opportunity and thereby enhance its presence. The conflict, and the settlements 
issue in particular, are still high on EU´s foreign policy agenda, and the EU continues to 
try and increase its actorness in relation to both. 
  
In April 2014, the US brokered peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, which 
had previously worked as the political perspective to the conflict, broke down. It had an 
original deadline of April 29 where an agreement should have been reached, however 
due to a deadlock between the parties, the US Secretary of State, Kerry, offered Israel 
that if they agreed to continue the talks throughout all of 2014, Kerry would make sure 
Abbas made no unilateral moves via the UN in the meantime (Ravid & Khoury 
31.03.14). The two parties never agreed on requirements for further negotiations, and 
Abbas instead unveiled the reconciliation plan for Palestine, organising different political 
factions of the West Bank which had prior been under the rule of Fatah represented by 
Abbas himself, with Hamas that ruled in Gaza (BBC 23.04.14). Previously they were 
divided both politically and geographically, but found a way to unite and to represent the 
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Palestinian people as a unity. This newly created unity of the Palestinian people made 
Israel reiterate from the negotiations arguing that it would be impossible for Israel to 
negotiate peace with a government that have signed a deal with Hamas who promoted 
the destruction of Israel (Lynfield 23.04.14). Netanyahu thereby used the perceived 
presence of Hamas as a terror organization as an opportunity for not continuing the 
negotiations and at the same time undermined both the capability and presence of any 
government linked to Hamas. Since the EU is in support of the negotiations sponsored 
by the US, the breakdown would at first seem like a constraint for EU´s achievements 
being the political goal of a two-state solution that is addressing the settlement issue. 
Without a political framework to work within, a solution seems impossible but it doesn't 
necessarily constraint EU´s actorness. As we learned in layer one, the strong presence 
of the US in the MEPP has actually limited the role and presence of the EU, and with 
the breakdown the EU instead had an opportunity to fully reverse its role as a 
bystander. 
The conflict then escalated during May and June with accusations of kidnapping, 
rockets fired by Hamas and further settlement expansions. This resulted in an Israeli 
military operation launched the 7th of July lasting 7 weeks, referring to the newly 
escalated conflict that killed more than 2000 people, of which most were Palestinians 
(EEAS 03.06.14). On June 3rd, the EU made an announcement on the formation of a 
Palestinian Unity Government and welcomed Abbas´s commitment to a two-state 
solution on the basis of 1967 borders and the recognition of Israel's right to exist (ibid.). 
Prior to this, the EU first issued several announcements urging the parties to return to 
the table of the current negotiations (EEAS 27.04.14), but when the presence of a Unity 
government was positively received by China, Russia, Turkey, United States and the 
UN, the EU also welcomed it (The Jerusalem Post 06.03.14). It was as an opportunity 
for the EU to stand stronger among some of the biggest actors in IR. The EU increased 
both the presence of the Unity government and the presence of the EU in the 
international community. A strong recognition from the international community further 
increased the opportunity and capability of the unity government and thereby works as a 
constraint against Israel. 
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These changed circumstances in the external environment, both on the grounds of the 
conflict by the escalation of violence and the “halt” in the peace negotiations, created 
changes to the opportunity structure of the EU, even though it was not something the 
EU had any influence on as such in that it was happening externally. Both the 
escalation of violence on ground and the peace negotiations breaking down worked as 
positive opportunities. The increased violence changed the priorities or focus from the 
international community in relation to the conflict, making a solution ever more needed. 
And a lack of any political perspective to the conflict i.e. that none of the parties have 
returned to the negotiation table opened up the opportunity for the EU to play a leading 
role in creating a new peace initiative themselves. 
  
EU official statements 
Over the course of the first five months of 2014 the EU issued a diplomatic statement 
each month expressing its concerns over the expansion of new settlements. Two 
rhetorical strategies seem to have come into light when analysing these official 
announcements meaning that the EU made use of two methods when trying to make its 
presence more significant. With reference to settlements being illegal under 
international law the EU anchors its statement in something superior, which Israel is 
also a subject to thereby pointing out the correctness of its statement to something that 
is not up for discussion and which the whole international community is founded on 
(EEAS 21.03.14). By mentioning how the EU has repeatedly warned against such 
actions before and by saying that all its constituting parts are supporting this view is an 
attempt to try an underline the importance of the EU´s capability as a big and united 
actor in foreign affairs, hence enhancing its presence (EEAS 24.02.14). However, the 
wording ´repeatedly`  implies that the same statement has been made before and 
allegedly not perceived as serious from the site of Israel, which thereby undermines the 
presence of the EU. Another important aspect of presence is how Israel perceives the 
EU, and no matter if the EU has rhetorically underlined the unity of its Member States, 
Israel knows that the competences and capability for the EU to act within foreign policy 
are limited, and that any direct actions consequently are limited as well. 
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From July onwards, the EU continued to issue announcements condemning the 
settlements with different wordings, but all referring to international law. Council of 
Foreign Affairs, 22nd of July, issued a conclusion, which included that future 
developments of relations between EU as well as both Israel and Palestine, depended 
on their engagement to a two-state solution (EEAS 22.07.14). Same strategy as 
previously by using its diplomatic presence to make Israel comply with EU intentions, 
but this time with an included threat for their future relations, underlining its severity. 
Although trying to use different methods to underline the importance of its diplomatic 
message against the settlements, Israel does not perceive the EU statements as being 
of any immediate threat for future cooperation. Each statement issued in 2014 concern 
settlements in different areas and thus implies that new expansions still continue in 
2014 regardless of EU efforts. 
  
From November 2014 onwards, the statements slightly changed with the new HR/VP in 
office. The first message condemning the settlements was issued on November 5th and 
concerned the newly announced Israeli settlement plans regarding 500 houses in East 
Jerusalem (EEAS 05.11.14). To make the statement slightly stronger than previously, 
Mogherini mentioned that several members of the international community and all the 
Member States of the EU had repeatedly pleaded on this issue, but unheard. This 
enhanced the presence of the EU as it underlined that it is constituted by 28 Member 
States and that the EU was not alone but standing together with the international 
community. This showed that multiple actors were involved implying that even if Israel 
choose to ignore the plea from the EU, it would have to ignore many other important 
actors as well. So she enhanced the presence of the EU by focusing on its unity and 
size. The HR/VP thereby slightly improved the rhetorical line towards Israel compared to 
previously, making the presence of it more strong. But whether it will create the 
opportunity for change is yet to show. 
  
Building onto the knowledge from layer one, the continuous expansion of Israeli 
settlements as a response to EU´s statements condemning exact same settlements is 
not a new behaviour from the site of Israel, and the EU should realise that its strategy of 
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making Israel comply by using diplomatic instruments in form of statements has not 
moved the EU any closer to any of its foreign political goals with regards to the conflict. 
Neither the settlements, nor the two-state solution. This clearly downplays EU actorness 
as being of any importance in foreign political matters and when the EU also fails to use 
its economic presence to gain more political presence by applying economic 
instruments, it decreases the perception of the first. Meaning, that if Israel does not 
acknowledge the economic incentives put forward from the EU for Israel to comply with, 
or at least do not acknowledge the threats made against them, then Israel downplay the 
importance of EU's economic presence. It further constraints any future actions to be 
made by the EU following the same subtle strategy, and instead create an environment 
in which the possible use of sanctions on incentives seems more like an opportunity. 
Since the political instrument of diplomatic statements condemning the settlements 
have not previously made Israel comply, the EU could instead have chosen to make a 
full use of its capabilities in form of sanctions or other policy instruments in order to 
create an opportunity to coming closer reaching its goal of stopping the settlements. 
  
The role of the EU and its capabilities 
Leading to which actions the EU is capable of taking, we have the concept of 
capabilities, which refer to internal factors of the EU and also the policy instruments 
available for the EU to use when trying to achieve its foreign political goals. Namely 
political or economic instruments. The political instrument in form of a diplomatic 
exchange of statements, announcements, recommendations and other forms of 
rhetorical or written negotiations has been widely used to express the EU´s official stand 
on the matter of settlements as in layer one, and continues to do so in 2014 as well. The 
understanding of capabilities is closely linked to competences within the EU, and since 
the EU does not enjoy exclusive competence in the area of CFSP, it is not an option for 
the EU to use hard power in form of military actions against the settlements. Although 
military action might not be the preferable solution of the EU towards the settlements, 
the perception of a strong and united EU that is able to utilize a common military power 
in foreign affairs, could according to the concept of presence change how serious Israel 
perceives the presence of the EU and thereby open up for an opportunity to act in non-
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military matters. Hence, a lack of military power of the EU, influence its presence 
negatively and thereby work as a constraint for EU actorness. 
  
Looking at the economic instruments the material existence of the EU as an economic 
integrating power still work as an important part of its perceived presence, although, the 
euro debt crisis might have decreased its economic presence to some extent. The EU is 
still the biggest provider of aid to the Palestinian people and one of Israel's largest 
trading partners, which confirm the economic presence of the EU and enables it to act 
to some extent, if its capabilities are utilised correctly. By using its economic presence 
to employ different sets of instruments such as the principles of incentives or sanctions 
i.e. carrots and sticks, the EU tries to increase its political presence and create an 
opportunity for further political action. The aim is to change the behaviour of Israel in 
relation to the settlements by including some of its political goals in relation to the 
conflict into the bilateral agreements between the two parties. 
The requirements that the EU includes in the agreement create the opportunity for the 
EU to follow up with direct actions, if not followed by Israel. 
  
But how has this affected the settlements? The expansion of settlements continue into 
2014 and neither the political instrument of subtle diplomacy, nor the economic 
instrument in form of economic incentives seem to having been effective and the 
sanctions available could, therefore, be relevant to look into. To further support this, an 
evaluation report on the ENP relation between Israel and the EU in 2013, was published 
in 2014. The report specifically mentioned how the EU has continued to engage with 
Israel in order to address the critical points of the settlement problematic, and how Israel 
instead have moved in an opposite direction of the intended increasing the settlements 
with 132% compared to 2012 (EEAS 27.03.14). This form of behaviour from the site of 
Israel undermines the presence of the EU in every aspect and calls for stronger and 
more effective instruments to be applied. 
  
Sanctions available to the EU in 2014 range from diplomatic sanctions; suspension of 
cooperation in various areas; trade sanctions and financial sanctions (Grieger 
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22.05.13). They can either be applied in a comprehensive manner meaning that it is 
directed at entire states, and therefore imply considerably human suffering for the 
population at large, or it can be targeted to impact the leadership, political elite or the 
section of society that is deemed responsible for the unwanted behaviour, and thereby 
seek to minimize human suffering (Ibid.). According to the strategy of implementation of 
EU sanctions the latter version of targeted sanctions is the desired option (ibid.). 
Suspending cooperation in various areas has been applied in the 2013 guidelines and 
includes a halt in the already existing association agreement between the two parties 
being a new approach by the EU (Ibid.). Though, the effectiveness of these guidelines 
have not yet been evaluated, the fact that an actual economic initiative that underlines 
and supports the diplomatic statements condemning the settlements has entered into 
force, is a sign that the EU now make use of its capabilities in the matter of sanctions 
instead of incentives. 
This has increased the seriousness of its presence and the EU seems like a more 
grounded actor putting actions behind its words. This would also work as a response to 
the criticism put forth by Seeberg (2009) that the EU needs to utilise its economic power 
to support and underline its political goals and increase its political power. The strategy 
of the EU to preferably utilise sanctions in a targeted manner instead of in a 
comprehensive manner could further explain, why the option of putting a general trade 
embargo against Israel has not been utilised. This would have serious consequences 
for the Israeli population at large compared to only disregarding the settlements as 
eligible for preferential treatment. 
  
The EU-Israeli relations 
What has emerged in the previous layer of analysis and which continues in the 2014 
timeframe is a deepening of the bilateral relations between the EU and Israel, 
regardless of developments related to the settlement problematic. An evaluation report 
on the ENP between Israel and the EU, published in March 2014, further supports this 
argument at the same time as it is pinpointing how recommendations in relation to the 
settlements from 2005, have yet to be implemented despite the deepening of 
cooperation between the parties (EEAS 27.03.14). This points to, that despite of the 
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embedded criteria that the ENP agreement include, and which must be fulfilled by 
signatories in the spirit of good governance, respect for international law and 
humanitarian law, have not been fulfilled in this case. The normative political 
requirements that are included in the agreements as part of EU´s economic instrument 
have simply not been enforced. Nevertheless, Israel has experienced no consequences 
of this breach and the bilateral relations between the two parties continues to expand, 
latest in the area of transport with the comprehensive civil aviation agreement which 
entered into force in 2014 (Ibid). Although the EU has the capability of suspending 
entire agreements in disrespect of the international law, this option has not been 
utilised. The report instead follows same subtle strategy of trying to implement its 
political goals via its bilateral agreements with Israel, but without any direct 
consequence, if not followed. 
The fact that the EU in its recommendations for future cooperation now also included 
the requirement of Israel to refrain from any actions that can undermine the peace 
process and a two-state solution, therefore seem less relevant and more like empty 
words. 
  
The understanding of a strategic culture in foreign affairs that influence how the 
expectations from other actors change in regards to the perceived presence of the EU 
hold relevance in this regard. If Israel continuously experience how the diplomatic effort 
to make them comply is not underpinned by the EU’s actual economic presence there is 
no reason for Israel to perceive the presence and thereby actions of the EU as being 
any different in the future. This perceived presence of the EU then further has the ability 
to change the behaviour of Israel in relation to the settlements and its partnership with 
the EU, meaning that it will affect the opportunity structure for EU actorness and pose 
as a constraint for EU action in relation to Israel. 
When core aspects of the agreements are not followed and recommendations by the 
EU not implemented without it having any influence on the beneficial aspect of the 
agreement for Israel, it seems like they are able to enjoy the benefits of its relation to 
EU and leave the rest if not aligned with its own policies. Thereby, enjoying the EU’s 
economic presence but ignoring its political and diplomatic presence as an actor in 
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foreign affairs which clearly influence the EU’s opportunity to act in the desired way. 
From an internal perspective within the EU it decreases its own confidence in being able 
to assert any real influence, but also has the possibility to affect the international 
community and how they perceive the presence of the EU. If other big and important 
actors such as the US and the UN repeatedly see their companion in regards to the 
MEPP being neglected and ignored without taking a stand, how serious and important 
an ally can they perceive the EU to be? This thereby affects the opportunity for the EU 
to act internationally through, for example, the Quartet. 
  
Normative values 
The EU can be said to have two sets of ground values. One of them is the function of 
economic integration, which is the reason for its entire existence and has continued to 
be its method of expansion throughout (Jørgensen & Rosamond 2001). The other is the 
core normative value of the EU meaning the self-perception of the EU, how the EU is 
represented and how it wants to be perceived by others. Both aspects are deeply 
embedded in the concept of presence as it entails the perceived identity of the EU and 
expectations of it. The perception of the EU´s use of economic integration as a strategy 
for expansion is embedded in the unintended external consequence of EU´s internal 
actions in the form of establishing an economic union between the different Member 
States. The normative values on the other hand, are very well intended and pushed 
externally by the EU, to influence other actors’ perceptions of the EU´s presence. 
According to Manners (2002) these values will not only influence how others perceive 
the presence of the EU, but also influence the very action of the EU, as the extensive 
promotion of its normative values to some extent also create a self-expectation to act 
accordingly, as well as others will expect them to.  
 
On one hand, the bilateral agreement between the EU and Israel is anchored in an 
economic relation and economic integration, but does at the same time include political 
normative goals. How far is the EU willing to compromise these two sets of values are 
they complementary to each other or do a fulfilment of one of them hinder success in 
the other? One thing is certain, the shared understanding that gives meaning to what 
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the EU is and what it does is heavily affected by how the EU manages to work with 
these two principles. Not managing to enforce and comply with its own values, the EU´s 
self perception will change and the identity of an EU that is the upholder of international 
law will be contested. This could affect the opportunity structure negatively and 
constraint EU actorness not only in relation to the settlements. 
 
In regards to the settlement issue, the two ground principles of economic integration 
and normative political values are intertwined and both are viewed as an opportunity for 
peace in the Middle East. A stronger economy for both Israel and Palestine via 
European economic integration is thought to improve the circumstances for peace 
between the parties (Pace 2014). Respect of international law, good governance, and 
democratic values are likewise viewed as an opportunity for peace if implemented, but 
when the method of utilising both is embedded in the same bilateral agreement, any 
inconsistency between the two will work as a constraint for EU actorness in all its 
aspects. 
  
The EU and the international community 
The role of the EU in the peace process has improved over the years, and continues to 
improve in small steps as the international initiative through the Quartet continues.  In 
the Quartet, the HR/VP represents the EU internationally and thereby, influences how 
other important actors perceive the engagement of the EU in relation to the conflict and 
further uses the international coordinated interaction as an opportunity to enhance its 
presence. With regards to the MEPP the EU has at several occasions issued 
statements expressing its full support of the effort made by the US and the Israeli and 
Palestinian engagement in the current negotiations (EEAS 17.03.14). The EU has 
further expressed its support of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap for peace 
set forth by the Quartet, emphasising these as opportunities for action as well as 
making its own presence secondary to the outcome. 
 
The violent escalation of the conflict has increased the EU’s opportunity to act via the 
international community as it has changed how other actors perceive the urgency of the 
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conflict. The fact that Israel chose to use the cease fire agreement to further expand its 
settlements have further implicated how other actors perceive the presence of Israel 
and the settlement issue, resulting in a changed behaviour of some actors. This 
indicates that a changed perception from the international community towards the IPC 
and the settlements have opened up for the opportunity for further EU action as the 
presence of the EU is perceived stronger together with other big actors in IR. 
Furthermore, the presence of the US in the MEPP no longer work as a constraint for 
EU's actorness as they have become more of an ally to the EU and now perceives the 
settlement issue alike. The fact that the presence of the US no longer serves the 
political framework in the MEPP further enhances the opportunity for EU actorness. 
  
Shared understandings within the EU and a new approach 
A change in the internal environment of the EU in 2014 was the appointment of the new 
HR/VP, Frederica Mogherini, who took office on 1st November (EEAS 09.11.14). This 
can affect the EU´s capability to act as well as its ability to respond to opportunities in 
the external environment as a collective voice within IR despite the lack in 
competences. The change in office also sends a message to the Member States that 
new times are ahead, and with Mogherini´s clearly stated vision of bringing the Member 
States of the EU even closer together on foreign policy matters, it could have an 
influence on EU actorness in the last couple of months of 2014 (EEAS 26.11.14). 
Applying the concept of opportunity, diverging interests and understandings between 
the Member States can work as a constraint for EU actorness, whereas a set of internal 
and shared understandings in relation to the settlement issue will enhance the 
perception of unity within the EU and thereby enhance its presence. 
  
At her first foreign affairs council meeting, she defined the Middle East conflict as a 
main priority and spoke about how the council will forwardly change its working methods 
to focus more on a united European action (EEAS 26.11.14). She expressed the urge to 
change the European way to a more active role, which implies that she is not satisfied 
with the current actorness of the EU in the IPC, and instead calls for increased action 
but with different methods than previously. In her speech to the parliament the next day 
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she again emphasised the Middle East conflict as a main priority, and how the previous 
strategy of European foreign affairs needed to change towards a more common 
approach (EEAS 27.11.14). She further referred back to her remarks to the foreign 
affairs council, which give some sense of unity between the council and parliament 
already, which is what the position of a HR/VP is responsible for, namely ensuring 
institutional coherence. Mogherini further acknowledged the critical point that the conflict 
has reached with external threats to the region that make the importance of a new 
political perspective ever more crucial and that the EU has an opportunity to be the first 
player facilitating this (ibid.). She visualised the EU being part of the new solution and 
urged the EU to come up with its own peace initiative. Mogherini thus seeks to use the 
breakdown in negotiations as an opportunity to further enhance the presence of the EU. 
She underlined that the European solution remains a two-state solution, but reminded of 
the importance in articulating what that actually means i.e. the creation of a Palestinian 
state, and that the time is crucial for the security of both parties (ibid.). Besides 
facilitating negotiations between the two parties, she therefore pleaded to the parliament 
for their help in establishing internal unity between the Member States towards a 
common approach and a common understanding on the issue. She acknowledged that 
neither the parliament nor her position as HR/VP have the competence to recognise 
other states (Ibid.). In other words, she acknowledged the constraints of EU´s 
capabilities in the area of CFSP and implied that the notion of a shared understanding 
of the EU from the concepts of opportunity and presence has to be utilised to deal with 
this constraint. Mogherini further stated that “only a united messages sent to the region 
by the EU will allow the EU to play its role at the fullest” (ibid.). Here all three concepts 
can be applied with equal relevance. Capability refers to how the EU is able to gather its 
different factions and stand united between different institutions and Member States and 
thereby send a signal of coherence in all its aspects. This will then increase the 
presence of the EU to a higher level and thereby, influence how it is able to utilise the 
externally created opportunity that the conflict in times lack a political perspective. 
  
The two new approaches from the EU work together and one does not exclude the 
other. If the EU does not manage to fulfil the role as a facilitator of a new political 
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framework and thereby increase its presence in the international community, the EU is 
still able to assert influence if it succeeds in forging unity among its Member States.  28 
Member States each with their full capability to act, might be perceived stronger than an 
EU speaking with one voice through the CFSP, but with no capabilities to enforce it. 
  
The EU on Ground 
In relation to diplomatic involvements there has been a strong diplomatic relation with 
several visits by Mogherini and Member States diplomats. These visits have been 
attempts to try and influence the government of Israel and Palestine to continue the 
peace negotiations and stop all actions hindering a two-state solution (EEAS 27.11.14). 
Diplomatic visits increase the physical presence of the EU as well as its opportunity to 
respond to circumstances on ground via its delegations. 
On November 8th, the HR/VP travelled to Israel and the Palestinian territories for talks 
with both Netanyahu and Abbas, and she visited both the West Bank and Gaza 
(Lazaroff 11.07.14). In the talks with Netanyahu, Mogherini clearly stated the view of the 
EU; “We need a Palestinian State (…) to support the two-state solution (…) which is in 
the opinion of all of Europe (...)” (ibid.). She at the same time ensured Israel that the EU 
is supporting Israel’s right to existence and security, but links it to the creation of a 
Palestinian state, saying that such is vital for the security of Israel. In this matter there is 
nothing changed in the European rhetoric, but the new thing is that she expressively 
links the creation of a Palestinian state to the security of Israel, which is a clever move 
since one of Israel’s main arguments is its right to security (Lazaroff 22.09.14). 
  
As a reply to the settlement concerns, Netanyahu stated that he “reject the fictitious 
claim that the root of the continuous conflict is this or that settlement. (...) Jerusalem is 
our Capital and as such is not a settlement. (...) The neighborhoods where Jews live 
and where we are building have been in the hands of Israeli government for the last 50 
years. (...) Everyone knows they will remain part of Israel in any peace arrangement.” 
(Lazaroff 11.07.14). Netanyahu showed little interest or respect for the concerns of the 
EU in this and downplayed the presence of the EU by ignoring its pleas. In return, 
Mogherini answered that the settlement issue is not one for interpretation; it is illegal 
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under international law, an obstacle to the two-state solution, and as such is the firm 
position of Europe and cannot be misinterpreted. When Netanyahu downplayed the 
presence of the EU, she lifted it up and made it stronger by anchoring it in international 
law as something more superior to which Israel also has to abide. The HR/VP further 
stated that Israel could count on the European Union to build this new start; “It´s also in 
European interest to have stability, security and peace in this part of the region, and we 
are convinced that the European Union can have a major role in supporting a solution” 
(EEAS 07.11.14).  She seeks the opportunity and invited the presence of the EU to fill 
the empty space after former peace negotiations broke down. 
  
Five Member States ministers also visited Israel (Lomonaco 21.11.14). Diplomats from 
Germany, UK, Italy, France and Spain attended a meeting at Israel's foreign ministry 
and after Israel's foreign minister mentioned the terrorist attacks which they live under, 
the Italian diplomat assured him of his support for the rights of Israel to defend itself. 
Such a visit from Member States diplomats to Israel, discussing the conflict and its 
elements, can either work against the common European approach or it can enhance it 
depending on the outcome of the visits. If the five European diplomats articulated a 
common European initiative in the same wordings as the HR/VP, it would increase the 
pressure on Israel. But if the interaction between Israel and the Member States do not 
underline a common stand, the EU then seem fragmented and cannot be taken serious, 
when the HR/VP says one thing and the constituting part another. 
  
Current events have now been analysed using our conceptual framework of opportunity, 
presence and capability. Together with layer one of the analysis, layer two helps to 
establish how previous events and actions by the EU as well as current events from 
2014 have influenced its actorness in relation to the settlements. We now move onto 
layer three of the analysis, which will constitute as the discursive part of the analysis. 
Findings from layer one and two will be discussed and enabling and constraining factors 
to EU actorness will be identified. 
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Layer 3 
In the third layer of the analysis we will partly draw on the findings from the previous 
layers identifying where the EU is heading in their policy towards the settlements. We 
will further identify the factors that seem to be most significant in enabling or 
constraining the EU actorness. Along with identifying the factors we will consecutively 
analyse the current state of the EU’s ability to act as well as discuss what could be the 
way forward for EU actorness on the settlement problematic. 
  
Bureaucratic processes 
EU actorness within foreign policy has been criticised on the basis of its institutional set-
up of the CFSP and bureaucratic processes within the EU. According to scholars this 
reflect too heavy a bureaucracy for any direct and quick actions to be taken due to the 
complexity of EU´s multilevel and heterarchical framework (Sweeney 2013). This makes 
it interesting to see how well established a link there is between the EU delegations and 
EU action and whether the heavy bureaucracy works as a constraint for EU actorness. 
The lack of competences to act within the CFSP further enhances the heavy 
bureaucratic process due to all the work reaching a common decision is spread out at 
various levels ranging from working committees, national parliaments, the European 
foreign council affairs linking the national parliaments with the EU, and of course EU´s 
main institutions; the Commission and the European Parliament (Ibid). 
The CFSP was created in order for the EU to speak with one voice on behalf of all of 
the Member States in foreign affair matters. This together with the settlements being 
illegal under international law created an underlying assumption that the internal aspect 
of the EU would not influence EU actorness on the matter of the settlements. The 
internal aspect, or the internal affairs, of the EU was thus not a main focus point from 
the outset of this analysis. 
However, the involvement of so many different levels and actors seem to constrain the 
process for action. There seems to be a need for more competences within the CFSP in 
order for it to be able to act, or other solutions need to be employed to ease up the 
constraints of its processes. A complex bureaucratic process is a constraint for EU´s 
capability to act and also a constraint in its opportunity structure as a lack in internal 
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capabilities influence EU´s ability to respond to opportunities present externally. A very 
complex bureaucratic system symbolises an incohesiveness in the EU´s presence and 
will affect how other actors perceive the EU and consequently also how the diplomatic 
statements made by the EU on the settlements. If the internal capability of the EU to 
formulate a common policy is limited by its very own process, actors like Israel will think 
that the EU is equally limited putting action behind its words in its statements. The 
capability of EU to speak on behalf of all its Member States thus seem to decrease in 
relation to the concept of presence and how others perceive the presence of the EU. If 
the very identity of the EU is perceived by others to be too complex it thus limits and 
constraints its opportunity to act. 
  
The physical presence on ground 
Delegations are EU´s physical presence on ground and if the EU wants to ensure that 
decisions in this area is based on well-informed data, it is both in the interest and 
responsibility of the EU to take this first hand data into account when deciding on future 
actions in relation to the settlements. The physical presence on ground thus increases 
the EU´s opportunity to make well-informed decisions and thereby also its capability to 
respond to events, on ground. 
Although, no direct link could be established in layer one of the analysis, it still implied 
that some actions were taken by the EU due to the information received from the 
delegations, namely, when Ashton condemned the settlements immediately after the 
first report was issued. The wordings of the first report issued by the delegations, that 
Israel had breached the commitment to the peace process by the expansion of 
settlements later started to repeat in the official EU statements condemning the 
settlements (A3. EU Heads of Mission 2012). The report recommended EU financial 
measures relating to the settlements to stop, where after, the EU in 2013 developed 
general guidelines that when implemented, should make sure that certain financial 
measures would no longer flow into the settlements, exactly, like the report 
recommended. The EU increased its capabilities by utilising one of its economic 
instruments putting a halt in cooperation in various areas. This implies that there is a 
link between the EU´s physical presence and how the main body of the EU acts, 
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accordingly. Although, the working documents laying ground for the guidelines never 
made a reference to neither the delegations nor their reports and were neither made 
official. Albeit this research has not analysed the internal bureaucratic process of the 
EU, it is fair to argue that a response time from 2011 to 2014 is a long time for such an 
important issue, which stands high on the EU´s foreign political agenda resulting in 
being a constraint for EU actorness. 
  
The EU also has a delegation present in Tel Aviv whose Head of Mission, Lars Faaborg 
Andersen, function as the Ambassador of the EU to Israel (EEAS 4 of 6). Compared to 
the work of the delegations in Ramallah and Jerusalem, the EU ambassador has a 
slightly different focus, which could be embedded in the fact that his delegation is in a 
geographical area away from the settlement issues. In his work with the Israeli prime 
minister and other actors in Israel, the ambassador of the EU to Israel is never as direct 
in his articulation regarding the settlements as the other two delegations (Times of Israel 
08.12.14 and EEAS 07.07.14). This indicates that the more authority a delegation has, 
the subtler is its work and support of EU´s stand on the matter of settlements. This 
underlines that it is in the EU´s interest to represent both sides of the conflict and be 
present in both places. In other words, the presence of the EU must be perceived 
positively from both Israel and the Palestinian authority for the EU to increase its 
opportunity to work as a mediator between the two. If either party perceives the EU´s 
presence negatively it will likewise affect the opportunity structure negatively and 
decrease its ability to work with the disagreeing party. 
 
When looking at the information available at the European Union External Action 
website there is a vast amount of information about the EU ambassador to Israel as well 
as his work within Israel. But there seems to be less information available on the other 
two delegations in Ramallah and Jerusalem implying that the presence of the EU in 
relation to Israel is more significant than the latter. Incohesiveness in the information 
flow from and about the various delegations to the EU could also work as a constraint 
for EU action as all the information ideally should be taken into account equally from all 
sides. It also confuses what other actors can expect from the EU. When the information 
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available is less concerned with the EU´s official stand and more concerned with Israel's 
right to security, it influences the perception of what the EU is and where its focus in 
relation to the conflict is. It might further influence the shared understanding within the 
EU of its own priorities and different actors at different levels could thus act differently in 
relation to the settlements. Those who attend the foreign council meetings and those 
who work in the committees could as a consequence have different information to work 
from. 
  
External and internal changes opening up new opportunities 
From layer one and through layer two it was identified how the involvement from the 
side of the EU in the MEPP has been less active though improved over time. 
Statements have been announced and some small initiatives have been agreed on, but 
not yet fully implemented and something needs to happen for the EU to separate itself 
from this ineffective process in order to get a more active role. The current breakdown 
of the peace negotiations and lack of a current political framework in which a solution 
can be reached, has changed the external environment and opened up a great 
opportunity for the EU to have a more significant and active role. This is a great 
opportunity for the EU to increase its actorness, but whether the EU is able to fulfil its 
aim is yet to be confirmed. 
With the newly appointed HR/VP in office, layer two showed that internal changes and 
developments could point to the EU having in mind to utilise the opportunity opened up 
by the recent events in the external environment to increase its presence. But the 
question is whether the EU has the necessary capability to do so and whether it will 
succeed in reaching a shared internal understanding on how to deal with such a role. 
However, as discussed above, the lack of competences of the EU to act on this, work 
as a constraint to action as well as to EU actorness. 
  
A new way forward 
Layer two of the analysis unveiled that Mogherini in her speech to both the foreign 
affairs council and the parliament, expressed the desire to try out a new way forward for 
the EU. Not necessarily an incorporated strategy of the EU as such, but utilising its role 
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to its full potential and in order to do so the EU must stand united on the issue. She 
acknowledged the constraining factor of a lack in capability to act and lack in 
competences and instead pursued a way around this constraint to increase the 
presence of the EU by gathering Member States in a collective approach. From the 
beginning of Mogherini´s time in office starting from November 1st 2014, she has been 
very that this approach should entail a European recognition of Palestine (Haaretz 
05.11.14). Her approach aims at increasing EU´s capability to act in relation to the 
settlements, but via the competence and capability of its Member States recognising 
conflicted areas as part of a Palestinian state. By using the capabilities of the Member 
States as an opportunity to increase EU actorness, this approach if effective, also 
enhances the presence of the EU by limiting the internal coherence problems. 
  
To support the argument of change within the EU towards a common approach on the 
settlements, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an article stating that they have 
attained a secret internal EU working document circulating among its Member States, 
which include inputs from the Member States on how to act against Israeli settlements. 
If the rumours about this document are valid, this does show some amount of support 
from the EU Member States (Ravid 22.10.14). The document, according to Haaretz, 
more or less define five red lines that if crossed by Israel, would be followed by some 
sort of punishment or sanctions from the EU, but at the same time urges the EU 
ambassador to Israel to deliver the message of a European wish for a thorough 
discussion on the five points and other points in relation to the occupied Palestinian 
territories (Ibid). This implies that the EU’s demands are not final and an opening up of 
dialogue in terms of interpretation and negotiations making the EU´s presence more 
weak and its opportunity to stand strong on its requirements in a negotiation less 
significant. The document further calls for unspecified moves against European 
companies operating in settlement areas. This warning seem to have reached several 
governments of the Member States, whereas Spain and Italy have already issued a 
national warning against their businesses with activities in the areas (Times of Israel 
Staff 27.06.14). Although we have not been able to attain this document, the 
ambassador of the EU to Israel explains to the newspaper Haaretz that the document is 
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a natural consequence of the Member States of the EU losing hope towards the two-
state solution because of the continuation of settlements, and he warns that more 
countries will follow if the path is not changed (Times of Israel Staff 27.06.14). The 
Israeli foreign minister, Liebermann, also responded to the article of Haaretz by saying 
that “We will not accept any restrictions on building in Jewish communities in Jerusalem 
(..). Those who think the government of Israel will surrender and restrict its construction 
in Jerusalem are wrong." (Ravid 16.11.14). This suggests that although the working 
document and the internal change in strategy towards the settlements, namely a 
recognition of Palestine, might have increased EU´s presence and its capability to act 
against the settlements, it might pose as a constraint for EU´s wish to fulfil the role as a 
key mediator for a new political perspective. Based on the above quote from Lieberman, 
it seems like any effective approach from the EU against the settlements, or any EU 
actions that is perceived as too harsh from the site of Israel, will create a distance 
between the two parties and, thereby affect the opportunity structure negatively in 
regards to what kind of role Israel will allow the EU to play in any future negotiations. 
  
The whole character of the document, namely an internal working paper between the 
Member States corresponds with Mogherini’s speech to the Parliament saying that the 
EP should help creating working papers aiming at a collective understanding of the 
MEPP and the settlements. This indicates that some form of unity on the matter is under 
development standing stronger than previously opening up prospects for the EU to act. 
Relating to findings in layer two, the only way for the EU to utilise its role to its full 
potential and increase its overall actorness, is by sending a unified message to Israel. 
Although, the parliament chose to postpone a vote on the recognition of Palestine in 
July 2014, due to mainly Germany as the big opposer and the work of Israeli diplomats 
in Brussels, it still seems like something is stirring internally in the EU and non-binding 
resolutions to recognise Palestine have already been passed in the Spanish, French, 
Irish and Swedish governments (Keinon 25.11.14). 
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Revised EU approach and the settlements 
If the EU succeeds in recognising Palestine it will have consequences for the settlement 
issue, as some parts of the newly recognised Palestine will be constituted by the 
settlements themselves, thereby leaving no room or right for the settlers. If Israel 
continues to govern the areas by military power, they are no longer occupying a 
territory, which did not belong to a recognised country prior to the occupation, but 
invading an actual sovereign state, which could be perceived differently by the 
international community. Nevertheless there is an expectation of strong international 
presence when a sovereign state is invaded. It is a long-term trial, but if the 28 Member 
States succeed in recognising Palestine it will enhance the presence of the EU 
dramatically and might pave the way for other countries to follow the same path as well. 
When enough countries have recognised Palestine expectations to uphold the 
sovereign right of a nation-state, which Palestine cannot enjoy before a recognition, will 
emerge. 
  
When only looking at the external change in the form of a lack of political perspective 
and the internal changes within the EU to create more unity to act in response to this 
change definitely enables the EU to act since the perception of unity enhances the 
presence. But in this case, also with the risk of unity being a constraint for its 
opportunity. As briefly touched upon previously in this section, an increase in the EU´s 
unity and thereby capability to act against Israel and its settlements could work as a 
constraint for EU´s opportunity to play a key role in any new political framework and it 
might change the perception Israel has of the EU´s presence. This could push Israel 
closer towards the US when seeking a partner to facilitate the working process of a 
solution to peace in the MEPP. If the EU manages to fulfil the empty space after the 
breakdown of the negotiations, and creates a new political framework based on a 
European perspective, the strategy of a recognition of Palestine would be at the core of 
such political framework. And if a recognition has not pushed Israel further towards the 
US, it instead increases the EU´s opportunity to act both in regards to settlements but 
also in regards to filling a more responsible role within the international community, 
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which will increase its presence as well as opportunity to act in any aspect in the 
international community in the future. 
  
The EU and Israel 
Based on the findings from layer one and two, Israel has not paid any special attention 
to the numerous of announcements from the EU condemning the Israeli settlement 
policy and calls for them to stop. Israel seems to have turned a deaf ear to the EU on 
the matter limiting EU´s opportunity to act. Despite of Israel's reluctance to address the 
concerns of the EU regarding settlements, the EU-Israeli relationship has continued to 
deepen and expand. Though the close relationship from the outset of the analysis was 
assumed to be a great opportunity for action and EU actorness, the strategy of 
governance through bilateral relations have proved ineffective with regards to the 
settlements so far, and the close relation between the parties might prove to be a 
constraint for EU´s opportunities and its presence as a close partner. This can affect the 
opportunity structure negatively. The settlement policy is high on Israel’s agenda, but 
does not seem to have the same priority on the agenda of the international community 
others than on paper. 
  
That Israel is so reluctant to cooperate and compromise is a constraint to EU action in 
several aspects; in relation to the relationship with Israel, how the EU presence is 
perceived by Israel and the international community and also in relation to its role in the 
MEPP. The behaviour of Israel towards the EU, thus pose as a constraint or opportunity 
for EU´s capability to act depending on the character of this behaviour, not only in 
relation to the settlements but on the international scene in general. 
  
The presence of the EU in the eyes of Israel still seems to be that of a spectator, even 
though the EU seems to have gained more influence in relation to the MEPP and 
thereby increased its presence to some extent. However, the EU’s opportunity to 
effectively act and have an impact on the settlement problematic is constrained by its 
close economic ties with Israel being an important trading partner for the EU (EC 
06.12.14). Israel is not only important to the EU in a purely economic perspective, but 
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also politically underlining the importance for the EU having peace in its neighbourhood 
in which Israel is a significant actor. Harpaz concludes in a 2008 article that further 
deepening of economic relations between Israel and the EU has more potential costs 
than gains for Israel offering the solution to Israel expanding its external trade relations 
to others than the EU (Harpaz 2008: 411). Harpaz highlights the BRIC countries as 
potential economic partners to Israel (ibid.). The rising of new economic powers in the 
world economy can at present in line with Harpaz’ argument be argued to constitute an 
alternative for Israel in the event that the EU should act upon its opportunity to utilise 
economic sanctions trying to influence the Israeli settlement policy. This means that the 
material existence of the EU, which we defined as its economic power has decreased. 
The presence of the EU has decreased along with the capability of utilising economic 
instruments in the form of sanctions, which thereby seem less effective. The possibility 
for Israel to initiate trade relations with others consequently diminishing the EU-Israeli 
trade relations can be looked at as a constraint to the EU’s opportunity to act, and might 
be part of the explanation of the reluctance. 
  
The EU has, as found in the former two layers, become a more significant actor in the 
MEPP, however, the conflict remains unresolved which points in the direction that the 
EU involvement has not been very effective. Israel has not been reluctant underlining 
that it does not see a need to link bilateral relations between the EU and Israel with the 
relations between Israel and the Palestinians (Ravid 16.11.14). This could imply that the 
effect of such implementation has severe consequences for Israel. However, Israel has 
continuously emphasised its own presence as dominant downplaying the presence of 
the EU. No one, and not even the presence or capability of the EU is able to change the 
behaviour of Israel. It seems that it has been in the EU’s interest to deepen its relations 
with Israel in order to make Israel more dependent on the EU to maintain their trade 
relations, however, this strive has continuously constrained the EU from putting action 
behind their words in relation to the settlements which has worked against EU 
actorness. 
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The EU and the international community 
It is not only the EU that has condemned the settlements but also among others the 
Quartet meaning that it is not only the EU that Israel has ignored but some of the major 
actors in the world. None of the initiatives taken by neither the EU nor the international 
community have recently influenced on the Israeli settlement policy and the settlements 
having been surrounded by security fences have resulted in the settlements becoming 
an integrated part of Israel. Leaving the settlements is therefore no longer seen as an 
option by Israel which has resulted in a situation where the two-state solution based on 
the pre-1967 borders seem rather utopian. Even perceiving the expansion of 
constructions in already existing Jewish neighbourhoods are disregarded as settlement 
activity by Israel. To reach a common conclusion on a problem where each part argue 
from a completely different logic seems rather impossible. However, a change in the 
external environment could affect the opportunity structure of the EU positively by for 
example an increased pressure from a lot of other actors in the international community 
as well as a more active role from the US against the settlements. This could potentially 
affect both the behaviour of Israel but also EU´s opportunity to act towards it. An 
increased presence from the international community could thus increase the presence 
of the EU and its ability to act towards the settlements, but an increased role of the US 
could on the contrary possibly pose as a constraint for EU actorness in the MEPP in 
general. 
  
Another aspect of the international community’s influence on EU actorness is the impact 
of the negative perception of EU´s presence in the eyes of Israel. The negative 
behaviour in the form of Israel ignoring EU´s recommendations and requirements, have 
according to the conceptual framework, the ability to influence how other actors in the 
international community perceive EU´s presence as an actor. And depending on the 
outcome being negative or positive, this will then further influence the opportunity 
structure and create either a constraint to EU action or an opportunity. 
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The insufficient role of international law 
Israel seems to be ignoring the presence of international law continuing its settlement 
policy. The settlements have since their initiation been illegal under international law, 
which is what is continuously referred to by the international community. However, both 
the Israeli and EU behaviour points to an undermining of the importance of international 
law. Israel ignores resolutions and the EU continues to trade with a state that 
continuously violates international law. This in itself seems rather controversial when 
simplifying it, especially when considering that the validity of international law depends 
on to what extend states accept it, and follow it. It therefore depends on the states 
behaviour towards it whereas behaviour of one state can be influenced by other states 
(Joyner, 2005:8) and the EU along with the rest of the international community could 
therefore be argued to carry a responsibility, which they articulate, but do not do 
anything about. Munin stated in 2011 that Israel’s constant undermining of international 
law principles would strain EU-Israeli relations, which to some extent carry validity in 
that the EU is condemning the settlements, however, on the other hand it does not 
seem to have actually been an important determinant in their relationship. 
  
A modified approach 
The EU seems to have changed its approach towards Israel during the years with 
stronger rhetoric and concrete initiatives, the latter referring to the guidelines. 
Especially, in 2014 with the new HR/VP more clear-cut rhetoric on both the MEPP and 
the settlements having been used both written and orally. During Mogherini’s last visit to 
Israel she underlined the importance of all parties in the MEPP to really understand 
what a two-state solution actually meant indirectly referring to the settlements as well as 
the creation of a Palestinian state. The sentiment between the two parties at the end of 
the visit clearly showed how they have different perceptions of the settlement issue and 
what a two-state solution actually means, which does not seem likely to change. 
Although they openly disagree on the matter, they show no sign of the disagreement 
being a constraint in their relationship and unless the disagreement is being addressed 
directly, the relationship will continue to develop unaffected. 
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Even though the message from the EU has become clearer it has not put a halt to the 
furthering of cooperation between Israel and the EU latest seen in the entering of Israel 
into the Horizon2020, where the EU again underlined the importance of the cooperation 
between the two (EC 08.06.14). 
  
Capabilities: Diplomatic instruments 
The continuous statements, announcements, opinions, and reports issued from the EU 
have been widely used diplomatic instruments, however, the words have not carried 
much action. That the EU has not actively acted on these diplomatic instruments being 
used, has resulted in them having become a constraint in relation to especially the 
presence of the EU. The statements have not had any effect and have symbolised more 
of a formality from the side of the EU having to condemn the settlements every time a 
new expansion was announced. The wording has expressed a united Europe, which 
enhances the presence and opportunity for action, however, this has not influenced 
Israel’s policy. The new HR/VP does, however, seem to have changed the wording of 
the statements slightly creating a new opportunity to increase the presence focusing on 
being very explicit in the interpretation of the words in the statements. Furthermore, she 
clearly articulates that a two-state solution equals the creation of a Palestinian state, 
which will result in Israel’s security. She uses Israel´s own argument of right to a 
secured presence, as the main argument for establishing a Palestinian state seeing an 
opportunity in the exact wording. 
  
Capabilities: Economic instruments 
Pace argues that the EU is more triggered using dialogue than making economic 
sanctions and that the EU does not see economic sanctions as an option (2014). This, 
she argues, explains the EU’s large focus on trade, which is also an aspect of the 
economic capability of the EU. The EU has been in a difficult situation in the relation to 
Israel attempting to maintain and establish a deeper relation by making sure to 
acknowledge Israeli initiatives by deepening bilateral agreements. Trade has been seen 
as an opportunity both in relation to economic self-gain as well as attempting to 
increase the EU presence in the eyes of Israel. However, the strategy resulted in the EU 
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giving more carrots than sticks, which ultimately has resulted in Israel having gained 
self-confidence looking upon the EU presence and capability as rather superfluous in 
impacting its settlement policy. Hollis argued in 2004 that the EU could make a 
difference in the conflict by among others offering Israel a special relationship with the 
EU on the condition that Israel gave up its claim to the West Bank and Gaza including 
the Arab East Jerusalem (Hollis 2004: 191). This strategy seems to have been 
employed by the EU, however, it has proved rather unsuccessful. The opportunity of 
utilising this instrument has in fact seemed to partly decrease the EU presence. 
  
In relation to what other economic instruments available for the EU to use, we should 
question what effect they would actually have. Perhaps, if the EU had used economic 
sanctions prior to the rise of other economic powers in the world, which represents an 
alternative for Israel, it could have had an actual impact in that Israel can be argued to 
having been more dependent economically on Europe. The material existence of EU as 
an economic entity would previously have enhanced EU´s presence more than it does 
today, and thereby increased its opportunity to utilise economic instruments as an 
effective capability. However, there is no doubt that Israel would suffer if the EU chose 
to utilise economic sanctions in that alone the import of goods from Israel to the EU 
amounts up to €11.2 billion (EEAS 5 of 6). Furthermore, it is well documented as also 
mentioned in the previous layers that the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. The EU 
may not intimidate Israel at present, partly due to the hesitance of action from the side 
of the EU with regards to economic sanctions, but it could potentially be a useful 
instrument for the EU considering the ineffectiveness the diplomatic instruments. Adding 
to this is the argument previously made, that the world economy has changed and the 
economic presence of the EU has decreased. The opportunity of an effective 
implementation of economic sanctions has therefore decreased as well, although, it 
might prove more effective than the economic instrument of incentives or the diplomatic 
instrument in form of statements and announcements. 
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Capabilities: Coherence of the EU 
Another aspect of capabilities is the understanding of coherence problems within the 
EU. Mogherini´s new way forward of collecting the constituting parts of the EU towards 
a recognition of Palestine includes several aspects of coherence. First of all, the 
function of the  HR/VP was established to ensure coordination between the different 
institutions of the EU in an attempt to create institutional coherence on foreign policy 
matters (EEAS 6 of 6). The function in itself has no real viable effect unless the person 
obtaining this function actually works directly towards coordination and define new 
methods of doing so. Mogherini´s first speech to the council of foreign affairs indicated 
that she plans to do so. Secondly, by gathering the Member States on the issue of the 
IPC she attempts to create vertical coherence and make the external policies of the 
Member States support the official EU stand creating unity. As explained in the 
conceptual framework the importance of vertical coherence is determined by the level of 
competence, whereof the CFSP has no direct competence and its representative, 
Mogherini, therefore needs to establish the coherence in other ways. 
The literature review identified a division between scholars and how they emphasised 
the importance of internal versus external factors when analysing the effectiveness of 
EU actorness. This analysis, on the other hand, shows that the external and internal 
focus cannot be separated as such and significant focus on one of them does not 
exclude the significant factor of the other. As an example, the external involvement from 
the EU in form of its relation with Israel has proved ineffective in relation to the 
settlements but increased its presence and engagement in the international community 
regarding the MEPP. On the other hand, only focusing on its external activities in 
relation to the settlements has made the EU lack internal capabilities to respond. The 
formulation of policies and the coherence of the internal policies, according to our 
conceptual framework, create a shared understanding within the EU in relation to the 
settlement issue. This then further enable the EU to respond to any externally created 
opportunity, which seems to be crucial at this very moment, both in relation to the critical 
point the conflict has reached but also for EU´s actorness in general. Despite the fact 
that the understanding of coherence was not an immediate focus of the analysis, all 
three aspects of it i.e. vertical, horizontal and institutional coherence seem to be 
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important in relation to what enable or constraints the action of the EU. The vertical 
coherence and institutional coherence played by Mogherini definitely seem to enable 
EU actorness. In line with horizontal coherence the next section on `the norms of the 
EU´ will elaborate on the incoherence that still exists in the field of different policy areas 
within the EU, such as economic integration in the form of trade and the more soft 
normative values of the EU such as human rights. 
 
The norms of the EU 
As mentioned in layer two, the EU is founded on two main principles; economic 
integration and its core normative values (Seeberg 2009). The EU has through its 
agreements combined the two trying to emphasise equal importance to them both. 
However, in the EU relation to Israel it seems that economic integration has been 
tipping the scale having a larger priority than that of core normative values - especially 
when observing the settlement problematic. Pace mentions the mainstream European 
position and argues that economic integration is a strategy on the side of Europe 
increasing the capacity for both the Palestinians and Israel to take an active part in the 
peace process (Pace 2014: 10). However, Israel does not seem to utilise this increased 
capacity and room for dialogue to obtain peaceful solutions, but on the contrary 
continues to undermine the peace process by building more settlements on land that is 
not rightfully theirs according to international law. The agreements in terms of the 
normative values constitute an economic instrument available for the EU to utilise being 
able to suspend the agreements on grounds of non-compliance with the basic principles 
in the UN Charter as for example human rights. The agreements made between Israel 
and the EU are extensive, and therefore seem like the immediate tool for the EU to use 
if wanting to assert influence on Israeli policies, but the EU does not seem to look upon 
this as an opportunity. The EU thereby chooses not to underpin its political agenda in its 
economic presence. The aspect of horizontal coherence severely harms the presence 
of the EU both in its self-perception as well as in the eyes of Israel when only focusing 
on the relations between the two, but also in the eyes of the international community. 
Israel is not at all intimidated by the agreements to which it is a signatory even though 
these normative values are clearly stated. Instead, Israel ignores them, and thereby 
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indirectly disrespects the EU and its actorness at large. The imbalance in the emphasis 
put on the two main principles indicate an incohesive external action in that one of the 
two main principles within the EU is not being respected, however, the economic 
relations continues to grow. In order for the EU to ensure compliance with basic 
principles in the UN Charter, and respect for international law the EU has to step much 
more into character looking for new instruments to utilise to increase its presence and 
create new opportunities exerting influence on Israel’s settlement policy. 
If the EU continues to downplay its core normative values, which it uses to describe 
itself establishing its very identity, which is how it wishes to be perceived by the 
international community, the EU could create future constraints for its actorness. In the 
long term, if its normative values are not upheld, other countries could change their 
perception of EU´s presence to be merely an economic integrating entity and not the 
promoter of peace and the protector of rights and law as described in its founding 
treaties. In other words, the continuation of horizontal incoherence between different 
policy areas, is a constraint for its presence and thereby its opportunity to act. Both in 
this specific case but also in future relations regardless of them being economic or 
political. A changed perception of EU´s economic presence will change the behaviour of 
future economic partners to the EU and a change in EU´s political and more normative 
presence will affect what actors in the international community can expect from the EU 
in times of conflicts. But because of the heterarchy nature of the EU´s multi-level polity 
complete coherence between different policy areas i.e. horizontal coherence is difficult. 
  
In conclusion of layer three, enabling and constraining factors to EU's actorness have 
been identified and the findings of previous layers discussed. The close EU-Israel 
relation proved to have a double faceted effect on the settlement issue and EU´s role in 
the MEPP. The bureaucratic processes of the EU have also been touched upon as a 
constraint to EU actorness as well as its internal problems of incoherence in all its 
aspects. Different policy instruments have been evaluated and discussed whereof the 
diplomatic instruments have proved its ineffectiveness. The economic instruments have 
yet to show any real effect and changes in the world economy could pose a constraint 
to these. Changes both in the internal and external environment of the EU have created 
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new opportunities for further action, namely a lack of current negotiations and the new 
approach forward presented by the newly appointed HR/VP. To create a full picture of 
the influencing factors that have been analysed, the research will now move on to the 
main conclusion. 
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Chapter 4 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the research question and accordingly conclude on 
the findings from the research. The analysis unveiled several findings, which will now be 
put into the context of answering the research question as it was intended to do from 
the outset.  
Conclusion 
Looking at the effectiveness of EU´s action towards the settlements we have found that 
a lack of direct action has influenced EU actorness in the MEPP negatively. The EU has 
not contributed much to the MEPP, and not at all with regards to making Israel change 
the path of its settlement policy. Contrary, we have seen how Israel has openly 
disregarded the concern of the EU on the settlements, confirming how Israel continues 
to defend its sovereignty. 
Further, a gap was identified between how the EU intends to act towards the 
settlements and what it actually does, harming the EU’s actorness in several aspects. 
Deepening the bilateral relationship with Israel as a mean of changing the behaviour of 
Israel at the same time as condemning its activities via diplomatic statements has 
proved ineffective and resulted in a lack of respect towards the EU by Israel, as they 
continue the settlement expansions uninterrupted. The close relation between the two 
parties therefore seems more of a constraint for further action than an actual 
opportunity. 
  
The EU to some extent succeeded in increasing its presence in the MEPP when starting 
to employ economic instruments, however, with regards to the settlements the selective 
use of economic instruments proved rather ineffective. Though nothing wrong with the 
strategy of achieving political goals via trade relations the requirements embedded in 
such an agreement needs to be upheld, and defended in order for there to be an effect. 
This might have proven to be too late now as Israel, due to the changing world 
economy, has alternative options deepening economic ties with other strong 
economies, such as the BRIC countries. Assuming from the outset, that the EU´s 
economic power could have proven to be a useful instrument in changing the behaviour 
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of the Israeli settlement policy, the effect of this instrument does not seem as significant 
as it once could have been. The strategy of having a tight relation with Israel was meant 
to improve the EU’s actorness, and contribute to the EU’s approach to the MEPP. But to 
a large extent this proved the contrary with Israel not seeming to care about the EU’s 
statement on that Israel’s settlement policy can have future consequences for their 
relationship. 
  
We have found that the external action of EU´s bilateral relations with Israel and the 
intended political outcome seem to be embedded in an incohesive relation between the 
two main principles within the EU, namely its economic integration strategy and its 
normative values. While the normative values laying the ground for the intended political 
outcome is disrespected and the economic factor continues to be nursed, we reach the 
conclusion that the incoherence between policy areas within the EU and how they are 
acted upon externally, makes the EU look like a split entity with no common direction. 
  
The intention of moving beyond the discussion of EU´s internal capabilities and solely 
focus on the external aspects proved difficult as the internal incohesiveness severely 
affected the external action. This is both due to the incoherence between policy areas 
within the EU as well as among the Member States, which is a huge constraint in 
sending a clear and strong external message on the matter of the settlements. 
The overall actorness of the EU on the settlement issue can therefore be concluded to 
not be cohesive having identified several factors constraining this factor. 
  
Looking ahead, the research also concludes that it seems that the EU is changing its 
approach moving away from making Israel comply via its bilateral relations and instead 
putting pressure on the issue of settlements by suggesting a recognition of Palestine. 
With the newly appointed HR/VP the EU further seems to be working on the coherence 
problems between the Member States and the EU, which seems to enable future action 
on the matter. If the EU succeeds in this new approach, the overall actorness of the EU 
on the matter of settlements could consequently be more cohesive and more in line with 
its official stand. 
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Reflections 
This chapter constitutes the theoretical and conceptual reflections and perspectives of 
the authors on the final version of the research. 
  
From a theoretical perspective, choosing to work with social constructivism enabled us 
to work with the complex interconnectedness of the different events analysed, and 
thereby expand our understanding of how each event have had an influence on the 
other. In the actual application of the conceptual framework, however, it proved rather 
difficult to apply the concepts separately and reflect on their meaning before analysing 
how they have affected each other. This approach, though complex, has proved 
necessary to analyse and fully understand the vast amount of information at hand and 
reflexivity has been a key element. 
Having learned that the internal factors of the EU play an inevitable role in the external 
action, 
  
This opens up for a slightly different approach to study EU actorness in relation to the 
settlements. Working with the concepts developed by Bretherton & Vogler, focus could 
have been solely on the concept of capability analysing the internal coherence between 
different EU institutions, Member States as well as the coherence between policy areas 
on everything related to this issue. This approach could be followed through with an 
intergovernmentalist approach to IR or institutionalism. The outcome could entail an 
understanding of EU´s internal capability to act externally, but lack an understanding of 
events in the external environment. Such a research would complement the knowledge 
created in this project and extend the knowledge on EU's actorness. 
 
Analysing the EU-Israel relationship has illuminated the aspect of international law and 
how it affects the international community and the relation between actors within it. Or 
rather, how the behaviour and non-compliance with international law by actors, affects 
the atmosphere in the international community. International law creates the system on 
which the entire international community is founded and when actors continue to 
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neglect the importance of the law questions of its validity occurs. This would deal with 
the ascribed values to international law and how these values affect the behaviour and 
identity of the international community. It would also be interesting to look into whether 
the neglect from one state would affect the behaviour of another state resulting in a total 
neglect of the respect of international law. 
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